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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Nothing causes litigators greater anxiety than the possibility of 
doing, or failing to do, something during a civil case that waives attorney–
client privilege or work-product protection.1  Attend any seminar, webcast, 
podcast, or other continuing legal education course dealing with the 
discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”) and you are sure to 
hear about this concern and how to mitigate it.2  Listen to any discussion 
                                                
* Paul W. Grimm is the Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland; Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom and Matthew P. 
Kraeuter are Judge Grimm’s law clerks.  The views expressed in this article are those of 
the authors alone and not the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. 
 
1 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“[Rule 502] responds to the 
widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of 
attorney–client privilege or work product have become prohibitive due to the concern that 
any disclosure (however innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver of 
all protected communications or information.”). 
 
2 See, e.g., J. Michael Rediker, E-mail and Document Production in Native Format, in 
767 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES, LITIGATION 195, 206-07 (2007) (discussing concerns over waiver of 
privilege in e-discovery situations). 
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or read any article or lawyer survey addressing concerns about the 
escalating costs of pretrial discovery, particularly in cases where ESI 
discovery is expected to be prominent, and you also will hear that one of 
the greatest costs of discovery is the pre-production review of ESI 
designed to ensure that privileged or protected information is not 
disclosed.3   
 
[2] The enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (“Rule 502”) in 
2008 was intended to provide a vehicle to reduce the anxiety and costs 
associated with privilege review, but to date it has not lived up to its 
promise.4  The explanation for why Rule 502 has fallen short may have to 
do with the reality that a disappointingly small number of lawyers seem to 
be aware of the rule and its potential, despite the fact that the rule is over 
two years old.5  Also, courts have not interpreted Rule 502 with sufficient 
consistency in reported decisions to enable practitioners and their clients 
to predict how they will fare if they attempt to take advantage of the rule 
to reduce the need for manual, document-by-document pre-production 
review by either employing electronic search and retrieval methodologies 
or entering into time and money saving non-waiver agreements.6   
  
[3] This Article will address the twin impediments to a fuller adoption 
of Rule 502 from the perspective of a trial judge who often is involved 
with regulating the discovery process in civil cases.  This Article also 
provides the perspective of one who is particularly familiar with the goals 
that underlie the enactment of Rule 502, having authored one of the cases 
that discussed the then-existing state of the law on the eve of the adoption 
                                                
3 See, e.g., Clayton L. Barker & Philip W. Goodin, Discovery of Electronically Stored 
Information, 64 J. MO. B. 12, 18 (2008) (discussing the “staggering” costs associated 
with pre-production review of ESI for privileged information). 
4 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
5 See, e.g., Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 427 (D.N.J. 2009) (noting that, one year 
after the enactment of Rule 502, lawyers failed to cite Rule 502 even though it controlled 
their motion). 
 
6 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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of the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that 
addressed the discovery of ESI and, in that case, expressed concern that 
the 2006 amendments did not contain sufficient protections against waiver 
of privilege or protection to promote the aspirations of the new rules.7  To 
undertake this analysis, the Article will focus on Rule 502 itself, section 
by section, with particular emphasis on the Advisory Committee’s Note, 
and it will discuss the cases that have, to date, interpreted each section of 
the rule.  Additionally, the Article will provide suggestions for interpreting 
and applying Rule 502 so that the rule effectively serves as a roadmap for 
avoiding or limiting the effect of disclosure of privileged or work-product 
protected information and any ensuing waiver. 
 
II.  OVERVIEW 
 
[4] Rule 502 is titled “Attorney–Client Privilege and Work Product; 
Limitations on Waiver.”8  As the title makes clear, the rule applies only to 
the attorney–client privilege and the work product doctrine.9  It has no 
effect on any other evidentiary privilege, such as the vast array of 
governmental, or other common law privileges, including the confidential 
marital communications privilege,10 the psychotherapist–patient 
privilege,11 the clergy–communicant privilege,12 the “law enforcement” or 
                                                
7 See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005); discussion infra Part 
II.A. 
 
8 FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 
9 See FED. R. EVID. 502.  The differences between the attorney–client privilege and the 
work product doctrine are discussed infra Part II.B. 
 
10 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (noting that there is an 
“independent rule protecting confidential marital communications”). 
 
11 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (noting that Rule 501 protects 
psychotherapist-patient communications). 
 
12 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 8 JOHN H. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (describing the test for 
determining whether a communication with a clergyman is privileged). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 3 
 4 
“informer’s” privilege,13 and the “deliberative process” privilege.14  In 
addition, Rule 502 only applies to certain types of waiver of the attorney–
client privilege or work-product protection, namely those made by an 
actual disclosure of the privileged or protected information.15  Further, 
Rule 502 addresses how a party can waive, or not waive, the attorney–
client privilege or work-product protection when making disclosures either 
in a “federal proceeding” or to a “federal agency.”16  Thus, the rule reaches 
disclosures made during civil and criminal proceedings in federal court, 
during administrative proceedings, and to federal administrative agencies 
during investigative proceedings.  
 
A.  Legislative History 
 
[5] Prior to, and foreshadowing, the enactment of Rule 502, in Hopson 
v. Mayor of Baltimore, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland recognized that the policy of “narrowly confining the attorney-
client privilege to its essential purpose, with subject-matter waiver as the 
price for unprotected disclosure” was at odds with “the distinct trend 
towards limiting the nature and amount of discovery to the needs of the 
particular case, given the issues in the case, the importance of the facts 
sought to be discovered, and the resources of the parties.”17  The court 
further acknowledged “the enormous costs that would accompany a 
requirement that in all civil cases the production of electronically stored 
information could not be accomplished until after a comprehensive 
                                                
13 See In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 927 (2d Cir. 2010) (considering the 
question of when the “‘law enforcement privilege’ must yield to the needs of a party 
seeking discovery in a civil action”). 
 
14 See Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) 
(mentioning the “deliberative process” privilege as a civil discovery privilege). 
 
15 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“[Rule 502] governs only certain 
waivers by disclosure.  Other common-law waiver doctrines may result in a finding of 
waiver even where there is no disclosure of privileged information or work product.”). 
 
16 See FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 
17 See Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 238 (D. Md. 2005). 
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privilege review and particularized assertion of privilege and work product 
claims,” and noted that ESI production costs could amount to millions of 
dollars, including tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars in privilege 
review costs.18  Additionally, the court observed that, “[w]ith regard to the 
process of assembling electronic information responsive to discovery 
requests, an entire industry of consultants ha[d] developed to provide 
services to litigants,” with one consultant estimating “‘2004 domestic 
commercial electronic discovery revenues were in the range of $832 
million - a 94 percent increase from 2003,’” and projecting revenues of 
$1.282 billion for 2005, $1.923 billion for 2006, and $2.865 billion for 
2007.19   
 
[6] With such exorbitant costs, “insist[ing] in every case upon ‘old 
world’ record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain of 
subject matter waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production that 
bear no proportionality to what is at stake in the litigation.”20  The court, 
quoting the Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States by the 
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, noted: 
 
The problems that can result from efforts to guard against 
privilege waiver often become more acute when discovery 
of electronically stored information is sought.  The volume 
of the information and the forms in which it is stored make 
privilege determinations more difficult and privilege review 
correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming, yet 
less likely to detect all privileged information.  Inadvertent 
production is increasingly likely to occur.21 
                                                
18 See id. 
 
19 Id. at 239 & n.32 (citing Socha-Gelbmann 2005 Electronic Discovery Survey, SOCHA 
CONSULTING LLC, http://www.sochaconsulting.com/2005surveyresults.htm (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2011)). 
 
20 Id. at 244. 
 
21 Id. at 232 (quoting COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE 
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 27 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE]). 
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Notably, pre-Rule 502 inadvertent production of privileged data could 
“constitute a waiver of privilege as to a particular item of information, 
items related to the relevant issue, or the entire data collection” in some 
jurisdictions.22 
 
[7] Thus, significant discovery issues existed, including: the privilege 
review a party producing ESI had to perform; whether counsel could enter 
into non-waiver agreements to permit post-production assertion of 
privilege; whether such agreements would be effective; and whether, 
under principles of substantive evidence law, inadvertent production 
resulted in waiver of privilege.23  Addressing these issues in Hopson, the 
court observed that “one of the most challenging aspects” of ESI 
discovery is “how properly to conduct Rule 34 discovery within a 
reasonable pretrial schedule, while concomitantly insuring that requesting 
parties receive appropriate discovery, and that producing parties are not 
subjected to production timetables that create unreasonable burden, 
expense, and risk of waiver of attorney–client privilege and work product 
protection.”24      
  
[8] To address these challenges, pending amendments to Rules 16(b) 
and 26(f)25 “encourage[d] the party receiving the electronic discovery to 
agree not to assert waiver of privilege/work product protection against an 
opposing party that agrees to provide expedited production of 
electronically stored information without first doing a full-fledged 
privilege review.”26  Specifically, the amendments authorized the court to 
issue scheduling orders to address non-waiver agreements between the 
parties, permitted the parties to ask the court to adopt their agreements, 
                                                
22 Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 232. 
 
23 Id. at 231. 
 
24 Id. at 232. 
 
25 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, at XII (Comm. Print 2009) (noting that the 2006 amendments went into 
effect on December 1, 2006).  
 
26 Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 234. 
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and permitted the parties to make post-production claims of privilege and 
work-product protection for ESI.27  However, as the court pointed out, the 
Report of the Judicial Conference noted that the proposed amendments 
only allowed for a party to claim privilege or work-product protection: it 
did not state definitively that producing documents pursuant to non-waiver 
agreements would not result in waiver of privilege or work-product 
protection.28  Thus, the amendments would permit parties to reduce “the 
burdens of privilege review” for ESI, “but at the price of risking waiver or 
forfeiture of privilege/work product protection, depending on the 
substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the litigation was pending,” 
such that “no prudent party would agree to follow the procedures 
recommended in the proposed rule.”29 
  
[9] Nonetheless, “parties, with the apparent encouragement of courts, 
ha[d] been using these procedures even in advance of the adoption of rule 
changes authorizing them.”30  Parties were “‘enter[ing] into agreements to 
disclose privileged materials provided the disclosure [was] not taken to 
entail waiver as to all privileged matters,’” and courts were upholding the 
agreements—or even adopting them as court orders—so that the parties, in 
theory, could “‘avoid the general rule that partial disclosure on a given 
subject matter [would] bring in its wake total disclosure.’”31  The 
agreements “‘protect[ed] responding parties from the most dire 
consequences of inadvertent waiver by allowing them to “take back” 
inadvertently produced privileged materials if discovered within a 
reasonable period, perhaps thirty days from production.’”32 
                                                
27 Id. at 233 (citing REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 21, at 26, 52). 
 
28 Id. (citing REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 21, at 26). 
 
29 Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 233–34 (footnote omitted). 
 
30 Id. at 234, 235 n.10 (collecting cases from 1950 through 2003 and noting that “[n]ot all 
courts have approved non-waiver agreements between counsel”). 
 
31 Id. at 232 n.1 (quoting EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND 
THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 287–88 (4th ed. 2001)). 
 
32 Id. at 232 (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004)). 
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[10] But, prior to Rule 502, these non-waiver agreements would not 
necessarily “insulate the parties from waiver” or be enforceable as to third 
parties.33  In part, their effectiveness depended on the court hearing a 
waiver argument, because the federal courts took “three distinct positions” 
as to whether inadvertent production waived privilege or work-product 
protection: 
 
The “strict accountability” approach followed by the 
Federal Circuit and the First Circuit [and the District of 
Columbia] (which almost always finds waiver, even if 
production was inadvertent, because “once confidentiality 
is lost, it can never be restored”); the lenient/ “to err is 
human” approach, followed by the Eighth Circuit and a 
handful of district courts (which views waiver as requiring 
intentional and knowing relinquishment of the privilege, 
and finds waiver in circumstances of inadvertent disclosure 
only if caused by gross negligence); and the third approach, 
adopting a “ ‘balancing’ test that requires the court to make 
a case-by-case determination of whether the conduct is 
excusable so that it does not entail a necessary waiver” 
[(adopted by a number of district courts within the Fourth 
Circuit)].34  
 
Considering these disparate views, the Hopson court cautioned that parties 
should “assume that complete pre-production privilege review is required, 
unless it can be demonstrated with particularity that it would be unduly 
burdensome or expensive to do so.”35  
 
[11] The Hopson court presented a “viable method of dealing with the 
practical challenges to privilege review of electronically stored 
information without running an unacceptable risk of subject-matter 
                                                
33 Id. at 235 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE § 55077, 579 n.22 (1986)). 
 
34 Id. at 235–36 (footnotes omitted). 
 
35 Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 244. 
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waiver.”36  Explaining that parties can avoid waiver successfully if “the 
production of inadvertently produced privileged electronic data [is] at the 
compulsion of the court, rather than solely by the voluntary act of the 
producing party,” and “the procedures agreed to by the parties and ordered 
by the court demonstrate that reasonable measures were taken to protect 
against waiver of privilege and work product protection,”37 the court 
proposed that courts issue protective orders, scheduling orders, or 
discovery management orders “that incorporate procedures under which 
electronic records will be produced without waiving privilege or work 
product that the courts have determined to be reasonable given the nature 
of the case, and that have been agreed to by the parties.”38  It elaborated: 
 
[P]arties that have entered into an agreement to preserve 
privilege claims with respect to production of electronically 
stored information [may] avoid subsequent claims by third 
parties that the production waived the privilege, provided: 
(a) the party claiming the privilege took reasonable steps 
given the volume of electronically stored data to be 
reviewed, the time permitted in the scheduling order to do 
so, and the resources of the producing party; (b) the 
producing party took reasonable steps to assert promptly 
the privilege once it learned that some privileged 
information inadvertently had been disclosed, despite the 
exercise of reasonable measures to screen for privilege and, 
importantly; (c) the production had been compelled by 
court order that was issued after the court's independent 
evaluation of the scope of electronic discovery permitted, 
the reasonableness of the procedures the producing party 
took to screen out privileged material or assert post-
production claims upon discovery of inadvertent production 
of privileged information, and the amount of time that the 
court allowed the producing party to spend on the 
                                                
36 Id. at 239. 
 
37 Id. at 240. 
 
38 Id. at 239. 
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production.39 
 
Thus, the permitted amount of ESI discovery would “be a function of the 
issues in the litigation, the resources of the parties, whether the discovery 
sought [was] available from alternative sources that [we]re less 
burdensome, and the importance of the evidence sought to be discovered 
by the requesting party to its ability to prove its claims.”40  
  
[12] In its proposal, the court relied on Proposed Rule of Evidence 512, 
which, while rejected by Congress, nonetheless “evidence[s] the common 
law of privilege and therefore may be applied under Rule 501 if reason 
and experience make such application appropriate.”41  Proposed Rule 512 
provides: “Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter 
is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was 
(a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the 
privilege.”42  Thus, Proposed Rule 512 “can contain” damage caused by 
the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information.43  Courts have relied 
on Proposed Rule 512 “to hold that a party that is compelled to produce 
privileged material, or erroneously produces it, does not waive the 
privilege.”44  Simply put, “provided the holder of the privilege has taken 
all reasonable measures under the circumstances to prevent disclosure, but 
was prevented from doing so by matters beyond his control, a finding of 
waiver would be unfair and improper.”45  While the mechanism to avoid 
                                                
39 Id. at 242. 
 
40 Id. at 244. 
 
41 Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 240 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 512.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 
2d ed. 1997)). 
 
42 Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 259 (1972) (Federal 
Rule of Evidence 512). 
 
43 Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 241. 
 
44 Id. (citing Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 575 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
 
45 Id. at 243. 
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privilege waiver that Hopson suggested was a means to avoid the harsh 
effects of waiver, it was nonetheless a Rube Goldberg machine46 that was 
both cumbersome and limited.  Essentially, it required the court to burden 
the parties with compulsion to conduct discovery in a manner that would 
enhance the risk of unintentional disclosure of privileged or protected 
information. 
  
[13] Two years after the Hopson decision, in September 2007, when the 
Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
approved Proposed Rule 502 and the Judicial Conference recommended 
its enactment, the Committee submitted the proposed rule to Congress.47  
The Committee submitted the proposed rule to Congress because, while 
the Rules Enabling Act provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the 
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of 
evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including 
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals,”48 it 
also provides that “[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an 
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act 
of Congress.”49  On February 25, 2008, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) 
reported the legislation out of the Committee on the Judiciary without 
amendment.50  By unanimous vote and without amendment, the Senate 
approved the legislation on February 27, 2008.51  The legislation passed 
the House on September 8, 2008 with an addition to the explanatory note 
                                                
46 See generally Rube Goldberg Biography, RUBE GOLDBERG, 
http://www.rubegoldberg.com/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (“A Rube Goldberg 
contraption . . . takes a simple task and makes it extraordinarily complicated.”). 
 
47 Bill Summary and Status, 110th Congress (2007 – 2008) S.2450, All Congressional 
Actions, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://Thomas.loc.gov./cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110: 
SN02450:@@@X (last visited Feb. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Bill Summary and Status].   
 
48 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
 
49 Id. § 2074(b). 
 
50 Bill Summary and Status, supra note 47.   
 
51 Id.   
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accompanying Rule 502 but without amendment to the proposed rule, and 
the President signed the rule into law on September 19, 2008.52   
 
B.  Distinguishing between Attorney–Client Privilege  
and Work Product Doctrine 
  
[14] The attorney–client privilege and the work product doctrine are 
distinct evidentiary principles, each of which protects a different interest.53  
“The attorney–client privilege protects the confidentiality of 
communications between attorney and client made for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice.”54  Its purpose is “to promote communication 
between attorney and client by protecting client confidences.”55  The 
attorney–client privilege “is one of the oldest recognized privileges for 
confidential communications.”56 Courts have narrowly construed the 
attorney–client privilege.57  
                                                
52 Id. 
 
53 See Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 463 n.10 (D. Md. 1998); 
see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 495, 508 (1947); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 
980, 984 n.4 (4th Cir. 1992); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 
1223 n.7 (4th Cir. 1976). 
 
54 Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(citing Am. Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 
55 In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988); see Swidler & Berlin v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (stating that the purpose of the attorney–client 
privilege is “to encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the 
administration of justice’”) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 
(1981)). 
 
56 Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389); see Mohawk 
Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 
470 (1888) (recognizing the attorney–client privilege). 
 
57 NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (“The privilege remains an exception to the 
general duty to disclose . . . .  It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it 
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[15] In contrast, the work product doctrine, first recognized in Hickman 
v. Taylor,58 “essentially protects the attorney’s work and mental 
impressions from adversaries and third parties even when communicated 
to the client.”59  Put another way, the work product doctrine guards against 
the discovery of “documents and tangible things that are prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its 
representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, . . . or 
agent).”60  Its purpose is to “shelter[] the mental processes of the attorney, 
providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his 
client’s case.”61  The doctrine affords the litigant “a broader protection, 
designed to balance the needs of the adversary system: promotion of an 
attorney’s preparation in representing a client versus society’s general 
interest in revealing all true and material facts to the resolution of a 
dispute.”62  Nonetheless, work product materials that are “otherwise 
discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1),”63 (i.e., relevant and non-privileged), are 
discoverable if the party seeking discovery “shows that it has substantial 
need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue 
hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.”64 
                                                
is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation for truth.  It ought to be strictly confined 
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principles.”). 
 
58 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; see Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 462; see also FED. R. EVID. 
502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
59 EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK–PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 1027 (5th ed. 2007). 
 
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
 
61 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); see Trs. of Elec. Workers Loc. No. 
26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(stating that the work product doctrine “creates a zone of privacy around counsel”). 
 
62 In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. 
at 238)). 
 
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i).  
 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
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[16] Work product falls into two categories: opinion work product, 
which contains the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories" of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the 
litigation,”65 and fact, or “ordinary,” work product, which refers to 
documents and things surrounding an attorney’s preparation of a client’s 
case which extends to information the attorney or her agent, assembles “in 
anticipation of litigation.”66  “[W]hat the work product doctrine is 
fundamentally designed to protect against is disclosure of ‘pure’ mental 
impressions or opinions of counsel.”67  In that vein, discovery under Rule 
26(b)(3)(A) generally is available only for fact, not opinion, work 
product.68   
 
[17] Waiver of the attorney–client privilege and waiver of the work-
product protection result from different circumstances.69  Waiver of 
attorney–client privilege “does not automatically waive whatever work-
product immunity that communication may also enjoy, as the two are 
independent and grounded on different policies.”70  Therefore, “[w]aiver 
                                                
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B). 
 
66 EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 946; see Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 
F.R.D. 458, 462 (D. Md. 1998). 
 
67 Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 466 (citing In re Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 625). 
 
68 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (“If the court orders discovery of [attorney work 
product], it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the 
litigation.”); Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 496 (2009)  
(“‘Whereas factual work product can be discovered solely upon a showing of substantial 
need and undue hardship, mental process work product is afforded even greater, nearly 
absolute, protection.’”) (quoting In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007)); see also Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 462 (noting that opinion work product is 
“‘nearly absolutely immune’ from discovery”). 
 
69 See Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 464 n.10. 
 
70 EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 1027. 
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of the privilege should always be analyzed distinctly from waiver of work 
product.”71  
  
[18] Attorney–client privilege waiver occurs when the client or counsel 
acts in a way “that is inconsistent with the continued maintenance of the 
privilege.”72  Although now tempered by the protections of Rule 502, as 
discussed infra, waiver of the attorney–client privilege may occur through 
“any disclosure, intentional, or even inadvertent, which is inconsistent 
with maintaining the communication as confidential.”73  The client holds 
the privilege and has the ability to waive it, either expressly or impliedly.74 
  
[19] Only disclosure “in a manner that is inconsistent with preserving 
the secrecy of that information from an adversary” waives the work 
product doctrine.75  Indeed, “‘the mere showing of a voluntary disclosure 
to a third person . . . should not suffice in itself for waiver of the work-
product privilege,’” even though it would “‘generally suffice to show 
waiver of the attorney–client privilege.’”76  Put another way, waiver of 
work-product protection only may occur when “a disclosure has been 
made which is consistent with a conscious disregard of the advantage that 
is otherwise protected by the doctrine.”77  Thus, inadvertent disclosure, 
which waives the attorney–client privilege, does not appear to waive the 
                                                
71 Id. 
 
72 Trs. of the Elec. Workers Loc. No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 
266 F.R.D. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 
73 Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 464 n.10 (emphasis added) (citing McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank 
of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 166–68 (D. Md. 1998)). 
 
74 Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 501 (2009). 
 
75 Trs. of the Elec. Workers Loc. No. 26 Pension Trust Fund, 266 F.R.D. at 15. 
 
76 Id. at 14 (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 
1980)). 
 
77 Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 464 n.10 (citing Doe v. United States, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081 
(4th Cir. 1981)). 
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“more robust” work product doctrine.78  The scope of waiver differs for 
fact and opinion work product.79  
 
C.  Organization of Rule 502 
   
[20] Rule 502 includes seven subsections: (1) disclosures in federal 
proceedings or to an agency that involve waiver of the attorney–client 
privilege or work-product protection, as well as the scope of that waiver;80 
(2) inadvertent disclosure of privileged or protected information, and when 
such disclosure does or does not result in waiver of privilege or 
protection;81 (3) disclosures in state proceedings, whether judicial or 
administrative, where there is no state court order in effect governing 
waiver of privileged or protected information;82 (4) the controlling effect 
of a federal court order stating that privilege or protection is not waived by 
disclosure, which is binding on parties and non-parties to the litigation, 
and applies to other federal proceedings, as well as to state proceedings;83 
(5) the effect of agreements between parties to federal proceedings to the 
effect that a particular disclosure will not constitute waiver of privilege or 
protection;84 (6) the controlling effect of Rule 502 as against all other 
federal and state proceedings, as well as court-annexed or court-mandated 
                                                
78 Id.; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 1037 (“Any inadvertent disclosure of work 
product should not ordinarily entail subject matter waiver.  Given the purposes that are 
served by the work–product doctrine such a result would in ordinary circumstances be 
perfectly extraordinary and entirely punitive for no cognizable judicial purpose.”). 
 
79 See infra Part III. 
 
80 FED. R. EVID. 502(a).  For convenience, this Article will refer to the attorney–client 
privilege as the “privilege” and work-product protection as “protection.” 
 
81 FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 
82 FED. R. EVID. 502(c).  
 
83 FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
 
84 FED. R. EVID. 502(e).  
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arbitration proceedings,85 and (7) definitions of the attorney–client 
privilege and work product doctrine.86   
  
[21] The Advisory Committee’s Note is crucial to a proper 
understanding of the purpose, scope, and operation of the new rule, and it 
provides vital guidance as to interpreting the rule in actual cases.  The 
introductory portion of the Committee’s Note is especially important, as it 
discusses the purpose of the rule and clearly identifies the rule’s 
objectives.87  As the note states, “[Rule 502] has two major purposes.”88  
First, it is intended to “resolve[] longstanding disputes in the courts about 
the effect of certain disclosures of communications or information 
protected by the attorney–client privilege or as work product–specifically 
those disputes involving inadvertent disclosure and subject matter 
waiver.”89  Second, the rule is intended to “respond[] to the widespread 
complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of 
attorney–client privilege or work product have become prohibitive due to 
the concern that any disclosure (however innocent or minimal) will 
operate as a subject matter waiver of all protected communications or 
information.”90  Cases involving ESI discovery heighten the fear of subject 
matter waiver.91  It is important to realize that Rule 502 “trumps” or 
supersedes court decisions rendered prior to the enactment of the rule that 
are inconsistent with it.92   
                                                
85 FED. R. EVID. 502(f).  
 
86 FED. R. EVID. 502(g).  
 
87 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.  
 
88 Id. 
 
89 Id. 
 
90 Id. 
 
91 See id.  
 
92 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (holding that a 
new federal rule of evidence superseded a common law rule that is either not 
incorporated or is inconsistent with the new rule). 
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[22] Courts called upon to interpret Rule 502 should be especially 
diligent in construing it in a manner that is consistent with its purpose.  
Otherwise, its goal of “provid[ing] a predictable, uniform set of standards 
under which parties can determine the consequences of a disclosure of a 
communication or information covered by the attorney–client privilege or 
work-product protection” cannot be achieved.93  The importance of this 
comment cannot be overlooked.  Rule 502 was enacted to provide lawyers 
and clients with a roadmap of how to avoid or limit the effect of waiver of 
privilege or work-product protection.94  It cannot function as intended if 
some courts interpret it in a manner that is not in concert with its purpose, 
because without uniform application, there can be no predictability.95  
Absent this predictability, the rule is robbed of its primary justification.   
  
[23] As this Article will demonstrate, some courts have interpreted Rule 
502 in a fashion that undermines these two primary purposes, by 
interpreting what “inadvertent” means in connection with Rule 502(b) in a 
manner that makes its implementation more cumbersome than intended,96 
or by rejecting as “unreasonable” efforts taken by lawyers to protect 
against waiver of privilege or protection in circumstances where a strong 
argument could be made that what was done was perfectly reasonable, 
given the nature of the litigation.97  Other courts have taken what may be 
regarded as an overly-restrictive approach in determining whether 
agreements that counsel enter into to avoid waiver of privileged or 
protected information pursuant to Rule 502(e) qualified for the protection 
that subsection (e) is intended to provide.98  Still others appear to have 
                                                
93 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
94 See id. 
 
95 Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“An uncertain privilege, or 
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, 
is little better than no privilege at all.”). 
 
96 See infra Part IV.A. 
 
97 See infra Part IV.B. 
 
98 See infra Part VIII. 
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engrafted a requirement of taking “reasonable” precautions against waiver 
when interpreting sections of the rule that do not themselves impose these 
requirements.99  It is sincerely hoped that in the future, reviewing courts 
will achieve sufficient uniformity in interpreting Rule 502 in accordance 
with its purpose to reach the twin goals of predictability and reduction of 
litigation costs associated with discovery of ESI for lawyers and clients.  
Interpreting the rule consistently with the discussion of its purpose 
contained in the Advisory Committee notes is one way reviewing courts 
can ensure that they are achieving these goals. 
 
III.  RULE 502(a) 
 
[24] Rule 502(a) states:  
 
When the disclosure is made in a Federal proceeding or to a 
Federal office or agency and waives the attorney–client 
privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to 
an undisclosed communication or information in a Federal 
or State proceeding only if: 
(1)  the waiver is intentional;  
(2)  the disclosed and undisclosed communications or 
information concern the same subject matter; and  
(3)  they ought in fairness to be considered together.100 
  
As the rule makes clear, it applies to disclosures of privileged or protected 
information made in a “federal proceeding” (judicial or administrative),101 
or to a federal “office” or “agency.”102  Further, subsection (a) applies 
when there has been (1) a disclosure that (2) “waives the attorney-client 
privilege or work-product protection,” but it does not attempt to categorize 
                                                
99 See infra Part VIII. 
 
100 FED. R. EVID. 502(a). 
 
101 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
102 FED. R. EVID. 502(a). 
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the circumstances that could lead to the conclusion that a waiver has 
occurred.103   
 
[25] To determine whether the disclosure constituted a waiver of the 
privilege or protection, you must look to: (1) Rule 502 itself (for example, 
a waiver can occur if a court determines, pursuant to Rule 502(b), that a 
party’s disclosure of privileged or protected information was not 
inadvertent, despite that party’s claim that it was); or (2) the common law 
of privilege or protection waiver to determine if there would be a waiver 
under the circumstances of the case.104  If there has been a disclosure that 
waives the privilege or protection, then Rule 502(a) provides that the 
scope of that waiver is limited to what was actually disclosed, and does 
not constitute broader subject matter waiver, unless (1) the waiver is 
“intentional,” in which case the scope of the waiver extends to (2) “the 
disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern[ing] 
the same subject matter,” but only if (3) the undisclosed communications 
or information “ought in fairness to be considered together” with the 
disclosed communications or information.105   
 
[26] Several important observations must be made about the text of 
Rule 502(a).  First, Rule 502(a) makes no attempt to define what the test is 
to determine whether the disclosure constituted an “intentional” waiver.  
The Committee’s Note offers guidance, however, by seeming to equate 
“intentional” waiver with “voluntary disclosure” that constitutes a waiver 
(under either Rule 502 or applicable common law), a conclusion supported 
by additional language in the Committee’s Note that “[i]t follows that an 
inadvertent disclosure of protected information can never result in a 
subject matter waiver.”106  Thus, Rule 502(a) does not require a 
demonstration that the party that disclosed the privileged or protected 
information subjectively intended to waive the protection, but rather a 
                                                
103 Id. 
 
104 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
105 FED. R. EVID. 502(a). 
 
106 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
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showing that the production was “voluntary” and not “inadvertent.”107  
Accordingly, if a party meant to disclose the privileged or protected 
information, knowing that it was privileged or protected information,108 
even if it did not then intend to waive the privilege or protection, the 
disclosure likely meets the “waiver is intentional” requirement of Rule 
502(a).109  
 
                                                
107 See id. 
 
108 See, e.g., Seyler v. T-Sys. N. Am., Inc., No. 10 Misc. 7 (JGK), 2011 WL 196920, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011) (concluding that the plaintiff’s counsel’s production of an e-
mail between the plaintiff and her sister, which was covered by the attorney–client 
privilege, “does not satisfy the higher standard of intentional waiver in Rule 502(a)” 
because the plaintiff’s counsel “did not at the time [of production] know that the 
plaintiff’s sister was a lawyer”).  
 
109 See, e.g., Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 
WL 4949959, at *12 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (rejecting the defendant’s claim of 
inadvertent disclosure of work product).  In Silverstein, the court found instead that the 
defendant disclosed the work product in order to “gain an advantage in the litigation,” 
and having done so, made a “conscious decision” not to request that the protected 
information be returned by its adversary. Id. at *7, 12.  Concluding that a voluntary 
disclosure of protected information to gain an advantage in the litigation was an 
intentional waiver under Rule 502(a), the court ruled that Rule 502(a)(3) “subject matter 
waiver” was appropriate because defendant “intentionally and willfully intended to 
mislead the plaintiff and gain an advantage in the litigation.”  Id. at *12-13.  Accordingly, 
the court extended the waiver to documents not disclosed, but concerning the same 
subject matter as the disclosed work product document.  Id. at *14.  In Chick-Fil-A v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 08-61422-CIV, 2009 WL 3763032 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2009), 
the court found that Exxon “voluntarily disclosed to its adversary” work-product 
protected information.  Id. at *3.  The court, while referencing Rule 502 to address the 
scope of waiver, held “[a]ccordingly, . . . that Exxon counsel’s intentional, voluntary 
disclosure to Chick-fil-A of attorney Quiralte’s Memorandum waived Exxon’s work 
product protection.”  Id.  Likewise, in Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, the Court 
of Federal Claims rejected the defendant’s contention that its production of work product 
information did not constitute a waiver because it was inadvertent pursuant to Rule 
502(b). 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 510 (2009).  Instead, the court held that production was 
intentional because the defendant had produced the work product information on three 
separate occasions and in a manner “so careless that it [could not] be construed as 
inadvertent.”  Id.  Therefore, the court looked to Rule 502(a) to determine the scope of 
the waiver.  Id. at 520–21.  
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[27] The Advisory Committee’s Note identifies the “evil” Rule 502(a) 
was intended to protect against, namely “situations in which a party 
intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, 
misleading and unfair manner.”110  This language provides additional 
support for the notion that the words “waiver is intentional” used in Rule 
502(a) are synonymous with “voluntary,” as opposed to “inadvertent,” 
disclosure.  Therefore, Rule 502(a) does not require a showing of 
subjective intent to waive privilege or protection.111  The principle is that a 
party cannot have its cake and eat it too.  If a party voluntarily discloses 
only a portion of privileged or protected information that is helpful to its 
litigation position, while concomitantly refusing to disclose harmful 
privileged or protected information relating to the same subject matter, 
such “selective” disclosure would be both misleading and unfair.112  Thus, 
the correct interpretation of the words “waiver is intentional” as used in 
Rule 502(a) is that the disclosure of privileged or protected information 
was voluntary, purposeful, and advertent, and that under either Rule 502 
or common law, such a disclosure constitutes a waiver.113 
  
[28] The second noteworthy observation about Rule 502(a) is that, in 
discussing the waiver of undisclosed work product information of the 
same subject matter as that which was disclosed, the rule makes no 
attempt to distinguish between fact work product and opinion work 
product.114  In contrast, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which 
“codifies the work product doctrine,”115 distinguishes between “opinion” 
work product—disclosure of which, Rule 26(b)(3)(B) cautions, courts 
“must protect against”—and “fact” work product, to which Rule 
                                                
110 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
111 See id. 
 
112 See id. 
 
113 Id. 
 
114 See FED. R. EVID. 502(a) (mentioning waiver of “work-product protection” without 
clarification). 
 
115 Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 462 n.6 (D. Md. 1998). 
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26(b)(3)(B) does not pertain.116  A court may order a party to disclose 
“fact” work product to an adversary that can show “it has substantial need 
for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, 
obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.”117  Rule 502(a) 
identifies circumstances in which work product waiver can extend to 
“subject matter” waiver, and it defines the scope of such waiver.118  The 
rule does not define the circumstances that can constitute such a waiver.  
Instead, it focuses only on the extent of any waiver that has occurred.119  
The common law and the other provisions of Rule 502 supply the 
circumstances that constitute a waiver.120 
  
[29] Despite the rule’s failure to address opinion and fact work product 
directly with respect to the scope of any waiver, reviewing courts have 
discovered an effective way to harmonize Rule 502 with Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(B) (“Rule 26(b)(3)(B)”).  They simply have held 
that the third element of Rule 502(a)—which provides that the scope of 
work product waiver extends to undisclosed communications or 
information relating to the same subject matter as the work product that 
intentionally was waived by disclosure, but only if the undisclosed work 
product “ought in fairness” be considered together with the disclosed work 
product—generally excludes opinion work product.121  The courts have 
                                                
116 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (protecting “mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the 
litigation”), with Reitz v. City of Mt. Juliet, 680 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) 
(citing Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 
F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2002)) (“‘Fact’ work product, which reflects information received 
by the lawyer, receives less protection than ‘opinion’ work product, which reflects the 
lawyer's ‘mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, judgments, or legal theories.’”). 
 
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
 
118 FED. R. EVID. 502(a). 
 
119 Id. 
 
120 See generally FED. R. EVID. 502; see also FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s 
note. 
 
121 See, e.g., Trs. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund 
Advisors, 266 F.R.D. 1, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2010) (“After enactment of Rule 502, the 
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done so on the theory that Rule 26(b)(3)(B) establishes that it is unfair to 
include opinion work product.122  
 
[30] If the language in Rule 502(a)(3), “ought in fairness,” sounds 
somehow familiar, it is because it originates in Federal Rule of Evidence 
                                                
questions are whether the disclosed and undisclosed information concern the same 
subject matter and whether they ought in fairness be considered together.  Thus, there is 
not now, and there has never been, the absolute subject-matter waiver that supposedly 
flows from the disclosure of work-product.”); Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 
07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 4949959, at *13 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (“Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) continues to provide special protection for opinion 
work product . . . .  Thus, when considering the fairness of granting a subject-matter 
waiver of work-product protection pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a), the court 
must pay close attention to the special protection afforded opinion work product.”); 
Chick-Fil-A v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 08-61422-CIV, 2009 WL 3763032, at *7 (S.D. 
Fla. Nov. 10, 2009), (citing with approval Eden Isle Marina, and concluding that “rule 
502 does not abrogate [governing Circuit authority] that ‘the subject-matter waiver 
doctrine does not extend to materials protected by the opinion work product privilege’”); 
Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 430 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding that it would be unfair 
and not within the interests of justice to conclude that, despite a party’s failure to show 
that production of privileged and work product-protected materials inadvertently were 
produced pursuant to Rule 502(b), waiver should extend to opinion work product); Eden 
Isle Marina v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. at 504-05 (“Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a) 
lacks any explicit language distinguishing between fact work product and opinion work 
product.  However,  . . . Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(B) . . . continue[s] to 
provide special protection for opinion work product . . . . Thus, when considering the 
fairness of granting a subject-matter waiver of work-product protection pursuant to  . . . 
502(a), the court must pay close attention to the special protection afforded opinion work 
product.”); see also In re EchoStar Commcn’s Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (concluding that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), opinion work product 
“deserves the highest protection from disclosure”); Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 
17 F.3d 1386, 1422, modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“‘opinion 
work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare 
and extraordinary circumstances’”) (quoting In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 
1977)). 
122 See Eden Isle Marina, 89 Fed. Cl. at 504–05; see also Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959, 
at *13; Chick-fil-A, 2009 WL 3763032, at *7; Peterson, 262 F.R.D.  at 430. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 3 
 25 
106, the so-called “rule of completeness.”123  The “rule of completeness” 
prevents a party from selectively referring only to part of a document or 
statement in a manner that is unfair or misleading.124  This concept fits 
well with the underlying purpose of Rule 502(a)(3): to prevent selective 
disclosure of helpful portions of privileged or protected information, while 
concomitantly withholding related information that is not helpful.125   
 
[31] Nonetheless, even though “Rule 26(b)(3) seems to give absolute 
protection for the mental impressions and opinions of an attorney,”126 and 
“a mere showing of need and an inability to obtain the work product by 
other means is not sufficient to pierce the protection accorded to opinion 
work product,”127 it is a mistake to say that Rule 502(a)(3)’s fairness 
provision categorically prohibits subject matter waiver of opinion work 
product across the board.  Indeed, the Supreme Court “rejected a proposed 
amendment to Rule 30(b) that would have given opinion work product 
absolute protection,”128 and later “explicitly declined to rule on the 
question of whether opinion work product, like materials protected by the 
                                                
123 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“The language [in Rule 502(a)] 
concerning subject matter waiver–‘ought in fairness’-is taken from Rule 106, because the 
animating principle is the same.  Under both Rules, a party that makes a selective, 
misleading presentation that is unfair to the adversary opens itself to a more complete and 
accurate presentation.”). 
 
124 See id. 
 
125 Id.  See generally Johnson Outdoors, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. 05-0522, 2011 
WL 196825, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan 19, 2011) (holding that the attorney–client privilege 
had been waived because the plaintiff relied on the attorney–client communications to 
support its claims, the withheld documents concerned the same subject matter, and “it 
serve[d] the interests of justice for all the communications to be considered together”); 
Dubler v. Hangsterfer’s Labs., No. 09-5144, 2011 WL 90244, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 
2011) (finding subject-matter waiver of intentionally produced documents because it 
would be “unfair to allow a client to assert a privilege and prevent disclos[ure] of alleged 
damaging documents but to allow the client to disclose other communications for self-
serving purposes regarding the same subject matter”). 
 
126 EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 946. 
 
127 Id. at 947. 
 
128 Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992).  
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attorney–client privilege, should be absolutely immune from discovery.”129  
The better approach is to recognize that, although greater protections 
surround opinion work product, it can be waived in certain circumstances, 
as provided for in the common law.130  For example, in In re Martin 
Marietta Corp.,131 some, but not all, work product materials were 
produced during settlement negotiations, and the court considered 
whether, through that disclosure, the party impliedly waived work-product 
protection for those documents and other documents of the same subject 
matter.132  The court concluded that the protection was waived as to fact, 
but not opinion, work product previously disclosed and other fact work 
product on the same subject matter.133  However, the court noted that 
“actual disclosure of pure mental impressions may be deemed waiver” and 
that “there may be indirect waiver [of opinion work product] in extreme 
circumstances.”134   
 
                                                
129 EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 947. 
 
130 See, e.g., Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 463 (D. Md. 1998) 
(discussing discoverability and waiver of opinion work product).  In Nutramax, the court 
noted that “the work product doctrine was not intended to ‘endow lawyers as individuals 
with an untouchable status,’ nor was it intended to be a ‘fringe benefit’ for lawyers who 
abuse the very judicial system the work product rule is intended to protect.”  Id. (quoting 
In re John Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981)).  Furthermore, the court held: 
 
If otherwise discoverable documents, which do not contain pure 
expressions of legal theories, mental impressions, conclusions or 
opinions of counsel, are assembled by counsel, and are put to a 
testimonial use in the litigation, then an implied limited waiver of the 
work product doctrine takes place, and the documents themselves, not 
their broad subject matter, are discoverable.  
 
Id. at 467. 
 
131 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 
132 Id. at 621, 624–26. 
 
133 Id. at 625. 
 
134 Id. at 626. 
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[32] Moreover, even courts that have held that Rule 502(a)(3) 
incorporates the special protection Federal Rule Civil Procedure 
26(b)(3)(B) affords to opinion work product have found that 502(a) 
subject matter waiver may extend to undisclosed opinion work product if 
the work product concerned the same subject matter of previously 
disclosed work product information that had been “intentionally and 
willfully” disclosed to the plaintiff during discovery to mislead the 
plaintiff “and gain an advantage in the litigation, six days before the close 
of discovery.”135  Accordingly, while it is appropriate for courts to 
consider carefully whether intentional waiver of work product protected 
information should be limited to what was willfully produced, and in 
doing so keep in mind the special protection afforded to opinion work 
product, it would not be appropriate to adopt an absolute, or near-absolute, 
prohibition against finding subject matter waiver even as to undisclosed 
opinion work product that had intentionally been disclosed.  In such cases, 
the interests of fairness (including mitigating the effects of an unfair and 
misleading selective disclosure of work product) may warrant such subject 
matter waiver. 
 
[33] The third and final observation is that, to ensure uniform 
“protection and predictability” of rulings under Rule 502(a), “the rule 
provides that if a disclosure is made at the federal level, the federal rule on 
subject matter waiver governs subsequent state court determinations on 
the scope of the waiver by that disclosure.”136 
 
IV.  RULE 502(b) 
  
[34] As noted above, one of the primary goals of Rule 502 was to 
resolve “disputes involving inadvertent disclosure” of privileged or 
protected information.137  Accordingly, it is not surprising that the vast 
majority of court cases interpreting the Rule have focused on the 502(b) 
                                                
135 Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 
4949959, at *13 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009). 
 
136 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
137 Id. 
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subsection, which addresses inadvertent disclosure.138  Unfortunately, this 
scrutiny has not always resulted in uniform interpretation of 502(b), which 
undermines the very purpose of the Rule.139   
 
[35] Rule 502(b) states:  
 
When made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office 
or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a 
Federal or State proceeding if: 
(1)  the disclosure is inadvertent;  
(2)  the holder of the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and  
(3)  the holder promptly took reasonable steps to 
rectify the error, including (if applicable) 
following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(5)(B).140 
 
As with Rule 502(a), the protections against waiver of privilege or 
protection found in subsection (b) govern both federal and state 
proceedings, meaning that if under subsection (b) disclosure is not viewed 
as a waiver, it also will not be a waiver under the law of any state, even if 
the identical conduct would be a waiver under the law of that state.141  The 
                                                
138 See, e.g., Alpert v. Riley, 267 F.R.D. 202, 209 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Rule 502(b) retains 
- without codifying - the multifactor test set out in the case law, which is “a set of non-
determinative guidelines that vary from case to case.’”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(b) 
advisory committee’s note).  
 
139 Compare Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 658–59 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (analyzing the 
circumstances surrounding the inadvertent disclosure to determine whether privilege was 
waived), with Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 
1038 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating that waiver is based on “whether the party intended a 
privileged or work–product protected document to be produced or whether the production 
was a mistake”). 
 
140 FED. R. EVID. 502(b).  
 
141 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (holding that a 
new federal rule of evidence superseded a common law rule not incorporated or 
inconsistent with the new rule); see also FED. R. EVID. 502(c).  
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protections of subsection (b) also apply to federal court-annexed and 
federal court-mandated arbitration proceedings.142  Additionally, 502(b)’s 
protections apply if three conditions are met: (1) disclosure is 
“inadvertent” (a word that the rule itself does not define); (2) the holder of 
the privilege or protection “took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure”; 
and (3) and the holder also “promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the 
error” when it was discovered, including compliance with Federal Rule 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), if applicable.143 
 
A.  Rule 502(b)(1):  “Inadvertent” Production 
  
[36] As noted, Rule 502(b) does not define “inadvertent,” and there has 
been a surprising amount of disagreement among reviewing courts as to 
what that word should mean in the context of the rule.  In Heriot v. 
Byrne,144 the court looked to pre-502 case law, which employed a multi-
factor test to determine if the disclosure of privileged or protected 
information was inadvertent.145  The court said: “To determine whether a 
disclosure was inadvertent, ‘this Court has  . . . look[ed] to factors such as 
                                                
142 FED. R. EVID. 502(f). 
 
143 FED. R. EVID. 502(b).  Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides: 
 
Information Produced.  If information produced in discovery 
is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation 
material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received 
the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a 
party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified 
information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the 
information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to 
retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; 
and may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a 
determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the 
information until the claim is resolved. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 
144 257 F.R.D. 645 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 
145 Id. at 659–62. 
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the total number of documents reviewed, the procedures used to review 
the documents before they were produced, and the actions of [the] 
producing party after discovering that the documents had been 
produced.’”146  The court in Silverstein took the same approach, noting 
“[c]ourts have considered a number of factors to determine inadvertency, 
including the number of documents produced in discovery, the level of 
care with which the review for privilege was conducted, and the actions of 
the producing party after discovering that the document had been 
produced.”147   
 
[37] Having done so, however, the Heriot and Silverstein courts then 
used essentially the same factors again to determine whether, under Rule 
502(b)(2), the producing party had taken reasonable steps to prevent 
disclosure of privileged or protected information, an approach that is both 
cumbersome and redundant.148  Thus, by using the factors that apply to a 
502(b)(2) analysis, the courts unnecessarily incorporated a 
“reasonableness” evaluation in determining whether, under Rule 
502(b)(1), production of attorney–client privileged documents was 
inadvertent.  
  
[38] This approach does not make sense, and evaluating reasonableness 
to determine inadvertence creates confusion.  It is true that the dictionary 
                                                
146 Id. at 658–59 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 
147 Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 
4949959, at *10 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (citation omitted). 
 
148 Id. at *11; Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 660; see Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors 
LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–38, (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Rule 502 does not define 
‘inadvertent.’  Under the prior case law, reaching the conclusion that a document had 
been ‘inadvertently produced’ required analysis of the circumstances surrounding the 
production, including the number of documents produced in discovery and the care with 
which the pre-production document review was performed. If the production was found 
to be inadvertent, the court used a ‘balancing approach’ to determine whether the 
inadvertent disclosure waived the privilege.  In that step, many of the same factors, such 
as scope of discovery and reasonableness of precautions taken, were reviewed again.”) 
(citations omitted).   
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definition of “inadvertence” is “a result of inattention” or “oversight,”149 
and the factors the Heriot and Silverstein courts looked to are logically 
relevant to determining whether a party’s production was through 
oversight or inattention, as opposed to being purposeful.  However, to 
require a court to review essentially the same factors again under Rule 
502(b) in assessing whether the producing party took reasonable 
precautions to avoid production of privileged or protected material is 
duplicative and inefficient.  Either production was inadvertent or it was 
not.150  If production was not inadvertent, Rule 502(b) does not apply.151  If 
production was inadvertent, then, and only then, should a court consider 
“reasonableness” to assess whether there was waiver. 
  
[39] A number of courts have taken a more useful approach, 
simplifying the Rule 502(b)(1) analysis by equating “inadvertence” under 
Rule 502(b)(1) with  “mistaken” or “unintentional” production, and then 
using the multi-factor tests found in pre-502 case law to measure 
reasonableness under Rule 502(b)(2) and (3).  For example, in Coburn 
Group, the court squarely addressed the confusion caused by the 
cumbersome pre-502 case law, concluding: 
 
In this court’s view, the structure of Rule 502 
suggests that the analysis under subpart (b)(1) is intended 
to be much simpler, essentially asking whether the party 
intended a privileged or work-product protected document 
to be produced or whether the production was a mistake.  
To start, the parallel structure of subparts (a)(1) and (b)(1) 
of Rule 502 contrasts a waiver that is intentional with a 
disclosure that is inadvertent.  More importantly, subparts 
(b)(2) and (b)(3) separately address the reasonableness of 
the privilege holder’s steps to prevent disclosure and to 
                                                
149 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 607 (1990). 
 
150 See Coburn Grp., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (stating that the analysis under 502(b)(1) 
only involves whether the party intended to produce the document or produced it by 
mistake). 
 
151 See id. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 3 
 32 
rectify the error.  That they are set out as separate subparts 
distinct from the question of inadvertent disclosure strongly 
suggests that the drafters did not intend the court to 
consider for subpart (b)(1) facts such as the number of 
documents produced only to repeat the consideration of 
those same facts for subparts (b)(2) and (b)(3).152 
 
[40] Other courts have followed the same approach.153  In Amobi v. 
D.C. Department of Corrections, the court explained why it would “use 
the word ‘inadvertent’ from Rule 502 to mean an unintended 
disclosure.”154  It reasoned: 
 
Rule 502 does not define inadvertent disclosure.  Prior to 
the rule, the court of appeals did not distinguish between 
inadvertent and other types of disclosure; however, other 
courts that followed a less strict construction of waiver 
considered a number of factors to determine inadvertency, 
including the number of documents produced in discovery, 
the level of care with which the review for privilege was 
                                                
152 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 
153 See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., No. 09-C-3607, 2010 WL 4512337, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010) (noting the various approaches courts have taken to define 
“inadvertence” under 502(b)(1) and reasoning that the “simpler” approach of whether 
production was inadvertent, a la Coburn Group, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1038, was “more 
compelling” than the multi-factored approach taken in Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 655, 658-59 
because “it would seem repetitive to apply factors from the balancing approach when 
Rule 502(b) explicitly requires examination of some of those same factors later in the 
analysis”); Gilday v. Kenra, Ltd., No. 1:09-cv-00229-TWP-TAB, 2010 WL 3928593, at 
*4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2010) (concluding that disclosure was inadvertent because defendant 
“did not intentionally produce the privileged documents”); see also Eden Isle Marina, 
Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 504 (2009) (“Thus, unintentional disclosures do 
‘not operate as a waiver’ of protection if the disclosing party establishes the elements set 
forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) . . . .”); Multiquip, Inc. v. Water Mgmt. Sys. 
LLC, No. CV 08-403-S-EJL-REB, 2009 WL 4261214, at *4 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2009) 
(“The analysis under FRE 502(b)(1) essentially asks whether the party intended a 
privileged document to be produced or whether the production was a mistake.”). 
 
154 262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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conducted and even the actions of the producing party after 
discovering that the document had been produced.  Other 
courts have found that Rule 502(b) provides for a more 
simple analysis of considering if the party intended to 
produce a privileged document or if the production was a 
mistake. This interpretation seems to be in line with one of 
the goals of the drafting committee: to devise a rule to 
protect privilege in the fact of an innocent mistake.  
 
Additionally, defining inadvertent as mistaken 
comports with the dictionary definition of the word: “Of 
persons, their dispositions, etc.: Not properly attentive or 
observant; inattentive, negligent; heedless . . . . Of actions, 
etc.: Characterized by want of attention or taking notice; 
hence, unintentional.” . . . Additionally, permitting 
“inadvertence” to be a function of, for example, the amount 
of information that had to be reviewed or the time taken to 
prevent the disclosure melds two concepts, “inadvertence” 
and “reasonable efforts,” that should be kept distinct.  One 
speaks to whether the disclosure was unintended while the 
other speaks to what efforts were made to prevent it.155  
 
[41] The courts that have construed “inadvertence” under Rule 
502(b)(1) as the equivalent of “unintentional” or “mistaken” have adopted 
an approach that is much more consistent with Rule 502 as a whole (in 
which the focus of 502(a) is intentional disclosure, and 502(b) is the 
opposite of that, namely, mistaken or unintentional disclosure).  This 
approach makes far more sense than the approach taken by the courts that 
have adhered to the pre-502 case law and repetitively applied the same 
balancing factors to determine inadvertence as to measure reasonableness 
of actions taken to prevent disclosure of privileged or protected 
information.  It is hoped that over time this far simpler and commonsense 
approach will become the prevailing view. 
  
 
                                                
155 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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B.  Rule 502(b)(2):  Reasonable Pre-Production  
Steps to Avoid Disclosure 
  
[42] Rule 502(b)(2) requires that, in addition to the production of 
privileged or protected information being inadvertent, the producing party 
also must have taken “reasonable steps to prevent disclosure . . . .”156  The 
Advisory Committee’s Note acknowledges the existence of a number of 
pre-502 cases that adopted a multi-factor test to determine whether 
inadvertent production of privileged or protected information would 
constitute a waiver, which included: (1) “the reasonableness of precautions 
taken[;]” (2) “the time taken to rectify the [erroneous production;]” (3) 
“the scope of discovery[;]” (4) “the extent of disclosure[;]”and (5) “the 
overriding issue of fairness.”157  However, the Advisory Committee 
observed: 
 
[Rule 502] does not explicitly codify [the multi-factor] test, 
because it is really a set of non-determinative guidelines 
that vary from case to case.  The rule is flexible enough to 
accommodate any of those listed factors.  Other 
considerations bearing on the reasonableness of a 
producing party’s efforts include the number of documents 
to be reviewed and the time constraints for production.  
Depending on the circumstances, a party that uses 
advanced analytical software applications and linguistic 
tools in screening for privilege and work product may be 
found to have taken “reasonable steps” to prevent 
inadvertent disclosure.  The implementation of an efficient 
system of records management before litigation may also 
be relevant.158 
 
                                                
156 FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 
157 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (citing Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985)). 
 
158 Id. 
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[43] There are several important take-away points in the Committee’s 
Note.  First, the pre-502 case law that adopted a multi-factor test for 
determining whether inadvertent production of privileged or protected 
information constituted a waiver is not automatically incorporated into 
Rule 502(b).159  Rather, the rule is intended to allow additional factors to 
be considered.160  Thus, the prior case law is relevant, but not dispositive, 
and courts should feel free to adopt a flexible approach that considers all 
facts relevant to determining the reasonableness of the producing party’s 
efforts to avoid disclosure of privileged or work product protected 
information.161  And, consistent with Rule 502’s goal of reducing the cost 
                                                
159 Indeed, a number of courts have observed that, although the multi-factor tests referred 
to in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 502(b) are relevant to determining whether 
reasonable pre-production measures were taken to prevent disclosure of privileged or 
protected information, they are not dispositive.  See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., 
No. 09-C-3607, 2010 WL 4512337, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010) (“[C]ourts agree that 
relevant factors from the previous balancing approach may be used to guide our 
decision.” (emphasis added)); N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v. Bound Tree Med., LLC, No. 
2:08-cv-101, 2010 WL 1873291, at *8 (S.D. Ohio. May 10, 2010) (“Rule 502 does not 
set forth a five factor test [referenced in the Advisory Committee’s Note] for determining 
waiver; instead, Rule 502(b) sets forth three elements that must be met in order to prevent 
the disclosure of privileged materials from operating as waiver.”) (citing FED. R. EVID. 
502(b)); Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 262 F.R.D. 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating 
that the common law multi-factor tests referenced in the Advisory Committee’s Note to 
Rule 502(b) provides “non-dispositive factors a court may consider . . . .  Despite this 
guidance, the Committee indicates that it consciously chose not to codify any factors in 
the rule because the analysis should be flexible and should be applied on a case by case 
basis”); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 
2905474, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (observing that Rule 502(b) adopts “essentially” 
the same approach as the pre-502 cases for determining whether reasonable steps were 
taken to avoid disclosure of privileged or protected information); see also Eden Isle 
Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 502 (2009) (noting that 502 does not 
“‘explicitly codify’” the pre-502 common law multi-factor test for determining 
inadvertent disclosure) (citation omitted); Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 655 n.7 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (determining that pre-502 common law multi-factor tests for pre-production 
reasonableness, supplement, not supplant, Rule 502(b)(2) analysis). 
 
160 See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 
161 See, e.g., N. Am. Rescue Prods., 2010 WL 1873291, at *9 (“[The pre-502 five factor 
balancing test] is not mandatory and merely serves to guide a court’s analysis when 
appropriate under the particular circumstances of each case.”); Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 54 
(noting that although Fed. R. Evid. 502 Advisory Committee’s Note refers to the pre-502 
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associated with discovery in general and discovery of ESI in particular, a 
court called upon to make an assessment of pre-production reasonableness 
under Rule 502(b)(2) should be especially mindful of the proportionality 
factors set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C).162  
Determining whether reasonable precautions have been taken cannot be 
done in a vacuum, and considerations of how much is at stake in the 
litigation and the resources of the party that inadvertently produced the 
privileged or protected information are both appropriate and necessary to 
ensure a proper interpretation of Rule 502(b)(2). 
  
[44] Second–and crucially–the Committee’s Note stresses how 
important it is that reviewing courts be receptive to the use of search and 
information retrieval methods that facilitate pre-production review of ESI 
                                                
multi-factor test, which includes “the overriding issue of fairness,” the drafters 
“consciously chose not to codify any factors in the rule because the analysis should be 
flexible and should be applied on a case by case basis”); Sensient Colors, 2009 WL 
2905474, at *3 & n.8 (stating that Rule 502(b) adopts an approach that is “essentially the 
same” as pre-502 multi-factor cases, and is designed to be flexible, with “no one factor 
[that] is dispositive” (citing Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note)); Peterson v. 
Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 428-29 (D.N.J. 2009) (observing that Rule 502(b) adopts a test 
that is “essentially the same” as pre-502 multi-factor tests, but the test is a flexible one, 
and the court is not required to accept bare allegations that a party conducted a reasonable 
pre-production review, and concluding that “[t]he interests of fairness and justice would 
not be served by relieving [the] plaintiff of the consequences of [his or her] counsel’s 
error” in failing to do a reasonable pre-production privilege review).  
 
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) provides: 
 
When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit 
the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules 
or by local rule if it determines that:  
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;  
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to 
obtain the information by discovery in the action; or  
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues.  
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via computer-based analytical methods, rather than the far more labor-
intensive and expensive process of having lawyers review each digital 
document.163  Simply put, one of the “two major purposes” of Rule 502 
was to bring down the cost of pre-production review of ESI by enabling 
lawyers and parties to use computer-based analytical methods to search for 
and identify privileged and protected information, as well as other 
analytical methods, such as sampling, that avoid the enormous expense 
associated with personal review of each digital document.164  The rule 
cannot achieve this goal if lawyers do not use these analytical methods, or 
if courts do not support their use by acknowledging that when the methods 
are properly used, they are reasonable.165   
 
[45] The analytical methods are reasonable, even though operators 
cannot guarantee the methods will identify and withhold from production 
every privileged or protected document.166  Reviewing courts must 
remember that the bellwether test under Rule 502(b)(2) is reasonableness, 
not perfection.167  If courts find waiver in cases where parties use 
                                                
163 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.  
 
164 See Gilday v. Kenra, Ltd., No. 1:09-cv-00229-TWP-TAB, 2010 WL 3928593, at *5 
(S.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2010) (“[H]ad [defense] counsel double-or triple-checked its privilege 
log against its production, this whole argument may have been avoided.  However, as this 
Court observed in Alcon Manufacturing Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-
TAB, 2008 WL 5070465, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008), ‘this type of expensive, 
painstaking review is precisely what new Evidence Rule 502 . . . [was] designed to 
avoid.’”). 
 
165 It is important to stress that use of computer-based analytical search and information 
retrieval methods involves technical and specialized methodology, and requires 
competence and expertise.  See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 
251, 260 (D. Md. 2008).  Merely using key word searches, concept searching, linguistic 
analysis, or sampling does not guarantee reasonableness, if the operators do not use the 
methodology properly.  Id. 
 
166 See id. at 262. 
 
167 See Multiquip, Inc. v. Water Mgmt. Sys. LLC, No. CV 08-403-S-EJL-REB, 2009 WL 
4261214, at *1–2, 5 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2009) (finding that, despite defendant’s reliance 
on his e-mail server’s “autofill” address function when forwarding an e-mail from his 
attorney—which resulted in it being sent to an unintended recipient who forwarded it on 
and, ultimately, it being provided to plaintiff’s attorney—there was no failure to meet 
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computer analytical tools properly, yet the parties’ privileged or protected 
information nonetheless is disclosed, then lawyers and clients never will 
transition away from the burdensome and very expensive methods that 
have lead to “the widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to 
protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have 
become prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however 
innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver of all 
protected communications or information.”168  Further, courts and litigants 
must remember that determining waiver is not an abstract exercise.169 
Aggravating circumstances in a particular case may lead a court to find 
waiver where a party employed an otherwise-reasonable search 
protocol.170  However, practitioners should not use such cases as guidance 
for assessing use of similar protocols under different circumstances.171 
                                                
Rule 502(b)(2) pre-production reasonableness, because the defendant’s actions, though 
“hasty and imperfect,” were not unreasonable, as the autofill function had not previously 
resulted in sending an e-mail to the wrong person); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 
No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (stating that 
plaintiff made “a commendable effort to employ a sophisticated computer program to 
conduct its privilege review,” but that, “[u]nfortunately, mistakes occurred,” and 
“Plaintiff should not be unduly punished for occasional mistakes that occurred while it 
started to use new software to organize and sort its documents,” because it employed 
twelve professionals to assist in the pre-production review for privilege and performed 
quality assurance/quality control to ensure completeness of the review and minimize false 
negatives and false positives); Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. 
Supp. 2d 1032, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“The standard of Rule 502(b)(2) is not ‘all 
reasonable means,’ it is ‘reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.’”); Heriot v. Byrne, 257 
F.R.D. 645, 660–61 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that all Rule 502(b)(2) required was 
reasonable precautions to prevent against disclosure of privileged or protected 
information, and that review of documents by paralegals before producing them was 
reasonable, and error by the vendor resulting in mistaken production to defendant of 
privileged documents did not render plaintiff’s efforts unreasonable).  
 
168 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (citing Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 
F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005)). 
 
169 See, e.g., Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 136 (S.D.W. Va. 
2010). 
 
170 See id. 
 
171 Cf. id. 
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[46] For example, in Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Felman Production, 
Inc., the court held that the plaintiff waived attorney–client privilege by 
inadvertently producing an attorney–client privileged e-mail.172  The court 
found the plaintiff’s e-mail production was inadvertent under Rule 
502(b)(1), and that the plaintiff complied with Rule 502(b)(3) by promptly 
demanding its return upon realizing that the e-mail had been produced to 
the defendant.173  Nevertheless, the court found that the plaintiff had not 
met Rule 502(b)(2) because the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps 
prior to the production of the e-mail to avoid its disclosure.174  The court 
reached this conclusion even though the plaintiff took what many would 
view as extensive precautions to avoid production of privileged 
information.175  The plaintiff negotiated an ESI stipulation with the 
defendants addressing the return of inadvertently-produced privileged 
information; hired an ESI vendor to assist in the collection, processing, 
and review of ESI prior to production; involved its own IT department to 
assist in the collection, processing, and review of ESI; selected search 
terms to retrieve documents responsive to the defendants’ Rule 34 request; 
selected privilege search terms to help identify privileged or work product 
protected information; and tested the effectiveness of the privilege search 
terms against the plaintiff’s e-mail files prior to production.176  The ESI 
vendor the plaintiff hired used Concordance Software, manufactured by 
LexisNexis, to process the ESI and apply the search terms.177  Despite the 
measures the plaintiff took, as to one of the database files, this software 
“inexplicably built an incomplete index of potentially privileged 
materials.”178  Although the record showed that LexisNexis was unable to 
                                                
172 Id. at 138. 
 
173 Id. at 133. 
 
174 Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 136. 
 
175 Id. at 135.  
 
176 Id. 
 
177 Id. at 135–36. 
 
178 Id. at 136. 
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explain how this error occurred, and despite the precautions that the 
plaintiff’s counsel took, the court concluded that the plaintiff and its 
lawyers “failed to perform critical quality control sampling to determine 
whether their production was appropriate and neither over-inclusive nor 
under-inclusive.”179  Accordingly, the court concluded that, because the 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it had taken reasonable steps to prevent 
disclosure of the privileged e-mail, it failed to comply with Rule 
502(b)(2), thus effecting a waiver of the privilege as to that e-mail.180   
  
[47] The Mt. Hawley court evaluated whether the plaintiff took 
reasonable steps to prevent the production of attorney–client privileged 
communications within the “context of the [plaintiff’s] overall e-discovery 
production.”181  In this regard, the court painstakingly analyzed the steps 
the plaintiff took.  It noted that the attorney–client privileged e-mail was 
produced from a Concordance file afflicted by a software error that 
created “an incomplete index of potentially privileged materials.”182  Yet, 
the court also noted that the plaintiff inadvertently produced 377 other 
privileged documents from Concordance files without software errors and 
without incomplete indexes of potentially privileged communications.183  
Moreover, the court observed that there were many other deficiencies 
associated with the plaintiff’s ESI production.  These deficiencies included 
the facts that more than thirty percent of its ESI production, roughly one 
million pages, consisted of irrelevant “junk documents” that significantly 
added to the defendants’ burden of reviewing the ESI it received; that the 
plaintiff marked each page of its massive ESI production as 
“confidential,” making a “mockery” out of the court’s form protective 
order; that, despite the ESI stipulation, the plaintiff failed to claw-back 
some of the privileged documents it produced; that certain documents 
                                                
179 Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 136. 
 
180 Id. 
 
181 Id. at 127. 
 
182 Id. at 136. 
 
183 Id. 
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claimed as privileged did not appear on any privilege log; that the plaintiff 
failed to test to determine whether its ESI production was either over-or 
under-inclusive; and that the plaintiff failed to perform simple keyword 
searches that would have identified the critical privileged communication 
that the plaintiff disclosed to the defendants.184  Further, the court found 
grounds to conduct in-camera review of proclaimed privileged documents 
because the defendants made a sufficient showing that in-camera review 
was appropriate to determine whether the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney–client privilege applied.185   
 
[48] The court also criticized the plaintiff for accusing defense counsel 
of ethical violations.186  The plaintiff claimed that defense counsel 
reviewed what they should have known were inadvertently produced 
privileged communications without notifying the plaintiff.187  The plaintiff 
based the objection upon a withdrawn ABA ethics opinion that no longer 
was applicable.188  When viewed in totality, the court found pervasive 
failures in the plaintiff’s compliance with its discovery obligations.189  
This undoubtedly affected the willingness of the court to give the plaintiff 
the benefit of the doubt in analyzing whether the plaintiff took reasonable 
precautions to avoid disclosure of privileged information pursuant to Rule 
502(b)(2). 
  
[49] The Mt. Hawley court was correct in scrutinizing the precautions 
plaintiff’s counsel undertook.  The court cannot be faulted for pointing out 
shortcomings such as the failure to test the reliability of key word 
searches.190  However, in doing so, the court set the bar quite high for what 
                                                
184 Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 128, 136. 
 
185 Id. at 138. 
 
186 Id. at 130.  
 
187 Id. 
 
188 Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 130–31.  
 
189 Id. at 131. 
 
190 Id. at 136. 
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it thought a party must do to avoid a finding of unreasonableness in 
circumstances in which plaintiff’s counsel took what many would regard 
as extensive precautions to avoid production of privileged or protected 
information.191   
 
[50] Mt. Hawley illustrates the challenge to courts, lawyers, and 
litigants.  Where do you draw the line between reasonable and 
unreasonable pre-production measures taken to avoid disclosures of 
privileged or protected information in cases where precautionary steps 
were taken, but were insufficient to prevent disclosure of all privileged or 
protected information?  Rule 502 will never reach its intended goal of 
reducing the cost of ESI discovery and encouraging the use of computer 
analytical review methodology if courts demand near-perfection in pre-
production precautions.  If, as Voltaire said, “the perfect is the enemy of 
the good,”192 it is also a disincentive for counsel and clients to accept the 
Advisory Committee’s invitation to abandon costly “eyes-on” review of 
all documents, even voluminous ESI, in favor of “advanced analytical 
software applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and 
work product.”193  It is hoped that future courts will be receptive and 
accommodating to the use of these screening methods to prevent 
disclosure of privileged and protected information.  While these methods 
are not perfect, there is growing evidence that they are as good, or far 
better than, “eyes on” review of all digital information by an attorney or 
paralegal.194 There is every reason to believe that computer-based 
                                                
191 See id. at 135–36. 
 
192 Voltaire Quotes, FAMOUS QUOTES, http://www.famous-quotes.net/Author. 
aspx?Voltaire (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
 
193 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 
194 See Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-
Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 
17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2011) http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i3/article11.pdf (stating that 
“[e]-discovery processes that use automated tools to prioritize and select documents for 
review are typically regarded as potential cost-savers—but inferior alternatives—to 
exhaustive manual review, in which a cadre of reviewers assess every document for 
responsiveness to a production request, and for privilege,” and then “offer[ing] evidence 
that such technology-assisted processes, while indeed less expensive, can also yield 
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screening methods’ recall (completeness) and precision (accuracy) rates 
will continue to improve.195  
  
[51] Third, courts should keep in mind that, even though the 
Committee’s Note encourages a flexible standard for evaluating 
reasonableness under Rule 502(b)(2), the inquiry still is to determine 
“reasonableness of precautions taken.”196  The inquiry is not whether a 
finding of unreasonableness, and consequently waiver, would be “fair.”197  
It is true that the “overriding issue of fairness” was one of the several 
factors included in one of the frequently-cited pre-502 tests applied to 
determine whether inadvertent disclosure of privileged or protected 
information resulted in waiver.198  However, courts should be careful not 
to let “fairness concerns” trump their evaluation of the reasonableness of 
the producing party’s pre-disclosure precautions.  If a court were to 
determine that the producing party truly had failed to exercise reasonable 
pre-production steps to avoid disclosure of privileged or protected 
information, but that a finding of waiver would result in some unfairness 
to the producing party, it is questionable whether a ruling that there was no 
waiver would be in accordance with the intent of Rule 502.  This is 
                                                
results superior to those of exhaustive manual review, as measured by recall and 
precision”); George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal 
System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 36–46, 66 (2007) http://law.richmond.edu/ 
jolt/v13i3/article10.pdf (stating that “the assumption on the part of lawyers that any form 
of present-day search methodology will fully find ‘all’ or ‘nearly all’ available documents 
in a large, heterogeneous collection of data is wrong in the extreme,” and noting that in 
“[a] leading study by Blair & Maron, . . . the legal teams [employing a manual document 
review] only found 20% of the responsive documents in a large subway crash case”).  
Paul and Baron also encouraged the use of electronic screening methods and stated that 
“whatever may be the limits of machine or artificial intelligence, in the near term future 
lawyers must not be afraid to embrace creative, technological approaches to grappling 
with the problem of knowledge management.”   Paul and Baron, supra at 66. 
 
195 See Grossman, supra note 194; Paul & Baron, supra note 194. 
 
196 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 
197 See id. 
 
198 Id. 
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because the rule itself speaks in terms of reasonableness of the precautions 
taken and not the fairness of the consequences for failing to do so.   
  
[52] Interestingly, the very first case to interpret Rule 502 after its 
enactment, Rhoads Industries, Inc. v. Building Materials Corp. of 
America, did exactly that.199  The court found that, “although [the plaintiff] 
took steps to prevent disclosure and to rectify the error, its efforts were, to 
some extent, not reasonable.”200  Applying the five-factor balancing test, 
the court found that the first four factors, which relate to reasonableness, 
“reviewed in the context of the evidence . . . favor[ed] Defendants.”201  
However, the court based its ultimate conclusion on its finding that “the 
fifth factor, the interest of justice, strongly favor[ed]” the plaintiff because 
“[l]oss of the attorney–client privilege in a high-stakes, hard-fought 
litigation is a severe sanction and can lead to serious prejudice.”202   
 
[53] The court concluded that the plaintiff did not waive the privilege 
for the hundreds of documents it inadvertently produced to the 
defendants.203  The result was in accordance with pre-502 case law, but 
appears to be at odds with Congressional intent, as expressed in Rule 
502(b) itself, which speaks only to “reasonableness” and not “fairness.”204  
A determination that a party waived the attorney–client privilege or work-
product protection always involves an element of unfairness and prejudice, 
but that does not produce a result that is contrary to the interest of justice.  
It is not unjust to find a waiver of privilege or protection when a party has 
failed to exercise reasonable steps to preserve it.  Excusing a failure to 
                                                
199 254 F.R.D. 216, 222, 226 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 
200 Id. at 226. 
 
201 Id. 
 
202 Id. at 227. 
 
203 Id. 
 
204 FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
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exercise reasonable measures to protect against disclosure solely based on 
unfairness interferes with the practice of the rule in the manner intended.205   
 
C. Rule 502(b)(3):  Prompt and Reasonable Post-Production  
Steps to Rectify Inadvertent Production 
  
[54] Rule 502(b)(2) requires that a party take reasonable pre-production 
steps to avoid inadvertent production of privileged or protected 
information.  Adding on to the 502(b)(2) requirement, Rule 502(b)(3) 
requires that the holder of the privilege or protection “promptly [take] 
reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).”206  Thus, both pre-
production and post-production measures must be reasonable in order to 
insulate inadvertent production from a finding of waiver.207  Two 
important observations may be made regarding Rule 502(b)(3): it does not 
require post-production review until a party has notice of possible 
inadvertent production;208 and it references compliance with Federal Rule 
                                                
205 See Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 655 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[The Rhoads court] 
has applied FRE 502(b) in a rather peculiar fashion, choosing to adopt the factors 
articulated in the committee’s note as a wholesale test of inadvertent disclosure.  
Strangely, using only the [pre-502 case law] factors to determine the waiver question 
eliminates any need to consult the elements required under FRE 502.  Such an approach 
would ignore a Congressional mandate and substitute judicial holdings for legislation.  
Therefore, this Court concludes that a better approach focuses on the elements required 
by FRE 502 and uses the [pre-502] factors, where appropriate, to supplement this 
analysis.”); see also Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 429 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding 
that plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that his attorney reviewed documents to screen for 
privileged or protected communications were not specific enough to demonstrate 
compliance with Rule 502(b)(2); and finding waiver, despite possible unfairness to 
plaintiff, noting that “[t]he interests of fairness and justice would not be served by 
relieving plaintiff of the consequences of counsel’s error . . . .  Parties must recognize that 
there are potentially harmful consequences if they do not take minimal precautions to 
prevent against disclosure of privileged documents”). 
 
206 FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
 
207 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 
208 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
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of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) as a means of reasonable post-production 
remediation, when applicable.209   
  
[55] With regard to the first observation, the Advisory Committee’s 
Note states that, although a party must initiate prompt, reasonable post-
production steps to rectify its inadvertent production of privileged or 
protected information, “[t]he rule does not require the producing party to 
engage in a post-production review to determine whether any protected 
communication or information has been produced by mistake.”210  
However, “the rule does require the producing party to follow up on any 
obvious indications that a protected communication or information has 
been produced inadvertently.”211  Thus, the producing party is spared from 
having to undertake its own review until it becomes aware of 
circumstances that put it on notice that privileged or protected information 
may have been produced inadvertently.   
 
[56] But, once such notice has been provided, any unreasonable delay 
in initiating reasonable steps to rectify the error will result in a 
determination of waiver.212  Courts that have faced the duty of interpreting 
Rule 502(b)(3) have underscored the fact that the crucial determination is 
not how long it took to discover the inadvertent production, but rather, 
how quickly the producing party reacted once discovery occurred.213 
                                                
209 See FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
 
210 FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 
211 Id. 
 
212 See, e.g., Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 
WL 4949959, at *12 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (holding that the defendants could not use 
Rule 502(b) because they did not take reasonable steps to rectify the inadvertent 
disclosure that had occurred four days previously). 
 
213 See, e.g., Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[T]hat Rule 502 does not require a post-production review supports 
[the] view that the relevant time under subpart (b)(3) is how long it took the producing 
party to act after it learned that the privileged or protected document had been 
produced.”); Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 429 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Although 
plaintiff did not alert defendants until months after his documents were produced when 
he was preparing for deposition, plaintiff brought the error to defendants’ attention within 
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Similarly, reviewing courts to date have rendered common-sense decisions 
regarding issues of whether a party’s post-production efforts to remedy an 
inadvertent production of privileged or protected information were 
sufficiently prompt and reasonable.214 
 
[57] An example is Coburn Group, in which defendant’s counsel 
discovered the inadvertent production of privileged or protected 
information, including an e-mail, four months after production when 
                                                
a week or two of his discovery.  Plaintiff was not required to ‘engage in a post-production 
review to determine whether any protected communication or information [was] . . . 
produced by mistake.’”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); Heriot v. Byrne, 257 
F.R.D. 645, 662 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[H]ow the disclosing party discovers and rectifies the 
disclosure is more important than when after the inadvertent disclosure the discovery 
occurs.”). 
 
214 See, e.g., Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959, at *12 (finding a failure to comply with Rule 
502(b)(3), which resulted in a waiver, because defendant discovered mistaken production 
of work-product document four days after it was produced, but never asserted the 
existence of work–product protection or requested that plaintiff return it, and stating that 
it was “irrefutable that while the defendants took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure of 
the document in the first instance, Defendants utterly failed to continue to reasonably 
protect the document and failed again to take reasonable steps to rectify the erroneous 
disclosure which had taken place only four days previously”); Multiquip, Inc. v. Water 
Mgmt. Sys. LLC, No. CV 08-403-S-EJL-REB, 2009 WL 4261214, at *5 (D. Idaho Nov. 
23, 2009)  (noting that defendant’s counsel asserted privilege and requested return of 
inadvertently-produced privileged documents on the same day, and nearly within the 
hour, of discovery of their production, and again the next day, and finding that the 
“relative contemporaneousness” of the remedial action met the requirements of Rule 
502(b)(3) reasonableness, and hence, there was no waiver); Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. 
United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 511 (2009) (holding that defendant “waived the work-
product protection” for documents used during depositions because defendant did not 
object during the depositions, did not seek to invoke the protections of Rule 26(b)(5)(B), 
did not seek a protective order, and “Defendant’s complete failure to take curative action 
[was] the antithesis of prompt rectification”); Peterson, 262 F.R.D. at 429 (noting that 
plaintiff’s attorney did not discover inadvertent production of privileged documents until 
months after they had been produced, but brought this to the attention of Defendant’s 
attorney within a “week or two,” and finding that this factor was “neutral” under Rule 
502(b)(3) and did not of itself warrant a finding of waiver, but ultimately finding waiver 
because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a privilege applied or that reasonable pre-
production steps were taken as required by Rule 502(b)(2)); Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 662 
(holding that notification within twenty-four hours of discovering the error was 
reasonable under 502(b)(3)). 
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plaintiff’s counsel asked questions about the e-mail during a deposition.215  
Defendant’s counsel objected during the deposition and, during another 
deposition the next day and again two days later, asserted that the e-mail 
was both privileged and protected, asking for its return.216  Plaintiff’s 
attorney refused to return either the e-mail or other documents that 
defendant claimed had been inadvertently produced, but agreed to 
“quarantine” them.217  Defendant’s counsel agreed to allow plaintiff’s 
counsel time to research the issue of waiver by production, and plaintiff’s 
counsel agreed not to raise any delay by defendant in filing a motion to 
compel return of the documents.218   
 
[58] Counsel agreed to a briefing schedule, and the motion was filed 
five weeks after plaintiff’s final refusal to return the documents.219  Noting 
that Rule 502(b)(3) does not require the producing party to conduct post-
production review, the court held that there was no waiver because the 
defendant acted with reasonable promptness in objecting after the 
discovery of the inadvertent production, and the delay in filing the motion 
was not unreasonable.220  The court reasoned that “the facts . . . show that 
counsel for both sides acted reasonably and civilly in dealing with the 
disputed documents and the associated deposition transcripts.”221  It 
observed that “the facts and law surrounding the documents . . . turned out 
to have some complexity,” and concluded: “In light of the fact that 
[defendant] accommodated [plaintiff’s] counsel’s request for additional 
time to formulate [plaintiff’s] position, and that [plaintiff] agreed to 
                                                
215 Coburn Grp., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1040–41.  
 
216 Id. at 1041. 
 
217 Id. 
 
218 Id. 
 
219 Id. at 1040. 
 
220 Coburn Grp., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1041. 
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‘quarantine’ the documents until the dispute was resolved, the time 
[defendant] took to file the actual motion was not unreasonable.”222  
  
[59] In United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., the court rendered another 
common-sense review of a party’s post-production efforts to remedy an 
inadvertent production.223  In Sensient, the plaintiff produced 45,000 
documents to the defendant on six different days between May 2008 and 
February 2009.224  On August 29, 2008, the defendant returned to plaintiff 
eighty-one potentially-privileged documents, and on September 10, 2008, 
the plaintiff informed the defendant that all but one of returned documents 
were privileged and had been produced inadvertently.225  Thereafter, from 
November 21, 2008 through August 2009, the plaintiff identified other 
documents as privileged, inadvertently produced on five different dates, 
but it did not complete its privilege “re-review” until August 2009.226  The 
plaintiff argued that the parties’ joint proposed discovery plan precluded 
any finding of waiver, but the court summarily rejected the argument 
because the plan made no mention of the parties exempting themselves 
from the provisions of Rule 502(b).227   
 
[60] As to the documents identified on September 10, 2008, the court 
found that all three elements of Rule 502(b) had been met and that there 
was no waiver.228  As for those documents identified on November 21, 
2008, the court found that the plaintiff had waived privilege because the 
plaintiff did not attempt to confirm its inadvertent disclosure until three 
                                                
222 Id. 
 
223 No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009). 
 
224 Id. at *1. 
 
225 Id. 
 
226 Id. 
 
227 Id. at *2.  See infra Part VIII for a further discussion of this aspect of the court’s 
opinion. 
 
228 Sensient, 2009 WL 2905474, at *4–5. 
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months after receiving notice from the defendant that privileged materials 
had been disclosed.229  Also, the plaintiff did not complete its privilege 
“re-review” until nearly seven months after the confirmation.230  The court 
found both of these actions were unreasonable under Rule 502(b)(3).231  
Similarly, the court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate Rule 
502(b)(3) post-production reasonableness as to the documents identified as 
inadvertently produced after June 2009 because the plaintiff waited nearly 
ten months to confirm its error.232  Accordingly, the court found waiver as 
to those documents as well.233 
  
[61] The second observation, as noted, is that Rule 502(b)(3) 
specifically identifies compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(5)(B), if applicable, as an example of reasonable post-production 
remedial action.234  Rule 26(b)(5)(B), added as part of the 2006 ESI 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
 
Information Produced. If information is produced in 
discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or of 
protection as trial-preparation material, the party making 
the claim may notify any party that received the 
information of the claim and the basis for it. After being 
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy 
the specified information and any copies it has and may not 
use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved.  
A receiving party may promptly present the information to 
                                                
229 Id. at *5. 
 
230 Id. at *5 n.13. 
 
231 Id. at *6. 
 
232 Id. at *7. 
 
233 Sensient, 2009 WL 2905474, at *7. 
 
234 FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (“[Disclosure does not operate as a waiver if] the holder 
promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).”). 
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the court under seal for a determination of the claim.  If the 
receiving party disclosed the information before being 
notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it.  The 
producing party must preserve the information until the 
claim is resolved.235  
 
The rule was added to address the increasingly difficult task of screening 
voluminous ESI for privileged or protected information before producing 
it in response to a discovery request.236  It was intended “to provide a 
procedure for a party to assert a claim of privilege or trial-preparation 
material protection after information is produced in discovery in the 
action, and if the claim is contested, permit any party that received the 
information to present the matter to the court for resolution.”237  
Importantly, adding Rule 26(b)(5)(B) to the civil procedure rules merely 
provided a process to resolve post-production claims of privilege or work-
product protection.238  It did not address the substantive issue of whether 
asserting such a claim after having disclosed privileged or protected 
information constituted a waiver;239 it took enactment of Rule 502(b) to 
accomplish that.240  
  
[62] Because Rule 502(b)(3) specifies that compliance with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), if applicable, is an illustration of how 
a party may demonstrate post-production reasonableness following 
inadvertent production of privileged or protected information, courts and 
parties should be familiar with just how Rule 26(b)(5)(B) was intended to 
                                                
235 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 
236 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note. 
 
237 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s note. 
 
238 Id. 
 
239 Id. (“Rule 26(b)(5)(B) does not address whether the privilege or protection that is 
asserted after production was waived by the production.”). 
 
240 See FED. R. EVID. 502; see also Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 233 (D. 
Md. 2005). 
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operate.  The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides 
the following guidance: 
 
 A party asserting a claim of privilege or protection 
after production must give notice to the receiving party.  
That notice should be in writing unless the circumstances 
preclude it.  Such circumstances could include the assertion 
of the claim during a deposition. The notice should be as 
specific as possible in identifying the information and 
stating the basis for the claim.  Because the receiving party 
must decide whether to challenge the claim and may 
sequester the information and submit it to the court for a 
ruling on whether the claimed privilege or protection 
applies and whether it has been waived, the notice should 
be sufficiently detailed so as to enable the receiving party 
and the court to understand the basis for the claim and to 
determine whether waiver has occurred. . . . 
After receiving notice, each party that received the 
information must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the 
information and any copies it has.  The option of 
sequestering or destroying the information is included in 
part because the receiving party may have incorporated the 
information in protected trial-preparation materials.  No 
receiving party may use or disclose the information 
pending resolution of the privilege claim.  The receiving 
party may present to the court the questions whether the 
information is privileged or protected as trial-preparation 
material, and whether the privilege or protection has been 
waived.  If it does so, it must provide the court with the 
grounds for the privilege or protection specified in the 
producing party’s notice, and serve all parties.  In 
presenting the question, the party may use the content of 
the information only to the extent permitted by the 
applicable law of privilege, protection for trial-preparation 
material, and professional responsibility. 
If a party disclosed the information to nonparties 
before receiving notice of a claim of privilege or protection 
as trial-preparation material, it must take reasonable steps 
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to retrieve the information and to return it, sequester it until 
the claim is resolved, or destroy it.241   
 
[63] In addition to suggesting steps that parties should use when 
invoking Rule 26(b)(5)(B), the Advisory Committee’s Note emphasizes 
that that rule “works in tandem with Rule 26(f).”242  It explains that Rule 
26(f) was “amended to direct the parties to discuss privilege issues in 
preparing their discovery plan,” and with amended Rule 16(b), Rule 26(f) 
“allows the parties to ask the court to include in an order any agreements 
the parties reach regarding issues of privilege or trial-preparation material 
protection.”243  Further the Advisory Committee’s Note acknowledges 
that, “[a]greements reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders including such 
agreements entered under Rule 16(b)(6) may be considered when a court 
determines whether a waiver has occurred.  Such agreements and orders 
ordinarily control if they adopt procedures different from those in Rule 
26(b)(5)(B).”244 
  
[64] It will come as no surprise that Rule 502 itself has a provision - 
Rule 502(e) - that recognizes that the parties themselves may negotiate to 
reach agreements as to how to protect against waiver of privilege and 
protection, including alternative post-production steps to those identified 
in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).245   Pursuant to Rule 502(d)–(e), the court itself may 
be called upon to approve such agreements and to incorporate them into a 
court order, as well as to interpret them in the event of a dispute regarding 
whether inadvertent disclosure should result in a waiver.246  Thus, an 
agreement to circumvent waiver of privilege or protection may be reached 
                                                
241 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s note. 
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pursuant to Rule 26(b)(5)(B), via Rules 16(b) and 26(f), or Rule 502(d) or 
(e). 
 
V.  RULE 502(c) 
  
[65] Rule 502 includes a conflict of laws provision aimed at simplifying 
situations in which a disclosure of privileged or protected information has 
been made in a state court proceeding, the disclosed information is offered 
in a subsequent federal proceeding, and the federal and state laws 
concerning waiver conflict.  Rule 502(c) states: 
 
When the disclosure is made in a State proceeding and is 
not the subject of a State-court order concerning waiver, the 
disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal 
proceeding if the disclosure: 
(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had 
been made in a Federal proceeding; or 
(2) is not a waiver under the law of the State where 
the disclosure occurred.247 
 
[66] To date, no court has interpreted this section, but the Advisory 
Committee’s Note is instructive.  The Committee’s Note explains “that the 
proper solution for the federal court is to apply the law that is most 
protective of privilege and work product.”248  Thus, Rule 502(c) protects 
the privileged or work product protected information if the disclosure 
would not have been a waiver under either federal law or state law.249  One 
rationale for applying the most protective law is that “[i]f the state law is 
more protective . . . , the holder of the privilege or protection may well 
have relied on that law when making the disclosure in the state 
proceeding.”250  Additionally, applying the federal law when it is more 
                                                
247 FED. R. EVID. 502(c).  
 
248 FED. R. EVID. 502(c) advisory committee’s note. 
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protective advances the federal objective of reducing or limiting 
production costs in discovery.251  Rule 502(c) does not attempt to alter the 
current statutory law or the principles of federalism and comity concerning 
the enforceability of a state court confidentiality order in a federal 
proceeding.252  Therefore, “a state court order finding no waiver in 
connection with a disclosure made in a state court proceeding is 
enforceable under existing law in subsequent federal proceedings.”253 
 
VI.  RULE 502(d) 
 
[67] Rule 502(d) allows federal courts to limit the circumstances in 
which production of privileged or protected information constitutes 
waiver.254  In this way, section (d) enables the courts to advance the goals 
of Rule 502–reduction of the expense of pre-production review for 
privileged and protected information and predictable, uniform standards 
concerning waiver of privilege or protection–through court orders.255  Rule 
502(d) states: 
 
A Federal court may order that the privilege or protection is 
not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation 
pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is 
also not a waiver in any other Federal or State 
proceeding.256 
                                                
251 See id. 
 
252 Id. 
 
253 FED. R. EVID. 502(c) advisory committee’s note. 
 
254 See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee's note (“Under [Rule 502](d), a federal 
court may order that disclosure of privileged or protected information ‘in connection 
with’ a federal proceeding does not result in waiver.”). 
 
255 Prior to the enactment of Rule 502, whether a confidentiality order entered in one case 
was enforceable in other proceedings was subject to dispute.  See Hopson v. Mayor of 
Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 n.10 (D. Md. 2005) (discussing the variations in judicial 
treatment of this topic). 
 
256 FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
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Thus, courts may allow the parties to engage in discovery without risking 
waiver of privilege or protection in the case at bar or any other federal or 
state proceeding.257  
  
[68] In Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, the court correctly exercised 
the powers set forth in Rule 502(d).258  In that case, McGuire Woods 
moved to add a claw-back provision to a protective order the court 
issued.259  The plaintiff opposed the addition of such a provision.260  
Observing that “the Rule ‘contemplates enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and 
‘quick peek’ arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive costs of pre-
production review for privilege and work product,’”261 McGuire Woods 
argued the claw-back provision was necessary to “prevent contentious, 
costly, and time consuming discovery disputes.”262  McGuire Woods 
explained that it already “reviewed more than 13,750 documents 
consisting of approximately 108,000 pages and that it plan[ned] to review 
and possibly produce many more documents.”263  Also, it estimated that it 
would need to review “at a minimum, . . . between 15,000 and 18,400 e-
mails (sic) messages, comprised of an unknown number of pages.”264  
Lastly, McGuire Woods argued that, because of the large number of 
clients to which the firm owed a duty to protect attorney–client 
                                                
257 See id. 
 
258 No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010). 
 
259 Id. at *2. 
 
260 The court had issued the protective order in response to the parties’ cross-motions for 
protective orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), after the parties had been unable to 
agree to terms for a protective order.  Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *1. 
 
261 Id. at *2 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
262 Id. 
 
263 Id. 
 
264 Id. 
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communications, the additional protections of a claw-back provision were 
warranted.265 
 
[69] In response, the plaintiff argued that the claw-back provision was 
unnecessary because “[Rule] 502(b) now sets forth a uniform standard to 
determine whether an asserted inadvertent disclosure results in a privilege 
waiver, including whether the privilege holder took reasonable steps to 
prevent disclosure of the privilege material.”266  In the plaintiff’s view, the 
provision would make the plaintiff responsible for McGuire Woods’ 
privilege review and require the plaintiff to “proceed with depositions and 
motion practice with the ever-present concern that any document could 
suddenly be taken back by McGuire Woods.”267  As discussed below, this 
argument completely ignores the purpose and intent of Rule 502. 
  
[70] Preliminarily, the Rajala court considered whether it had the 
authority to issue an order with a claw-back provision, without party 
agreement.268  The court concluded that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(c)(1), it did have such authority, reasoning that Rule 
26(c)(1)(B) provides that “[a] [c]ourt may, ‘for good cause, issue an order 
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 
or undue burden or expense,’269 . . . . ‘specifying terms, including time and 
                                                
265 Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *2. 
 
266 Id. at *3. 
 
267 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).  
 
268 Id. at *5.  It is important to note that while Rule 502 expressly states that the “court 
may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the 
litigation pending before the court,” it is an evidentiary rule, not a procedural rule.  FED. 
R. EVID. 502(d).  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c), 26(b)(2)(C), and 16(b), 
however, provide ample authority in a civil case for a court to issue an order that provides 
the protections stated in Rule 502(d).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).  
 
269 Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *5 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)). 
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place, for the disclosure or discovery.’”270  The court also relied on the 
Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), which 
provides that, “[u]nder the rule, a confidentiality order is enforceable 
whether or not it memorializes an agreement among the parties to the 
litigation.  Party agreement should not be a condition of enforceability of a 
federal court’s order.”271  The court further observed that the 2006 
Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) 
specifically contemplates claw-back agreements “as a way to reduce 
discovery costs and minimize the risk of privilege waiver,” and that Rule 
502 “validates . . . clawback provisions or agreements” that “‘provide for 
the return of [privileged or protected] documents without waiver 
irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party . . . .’”272  Thus, the 
court concluded, “a court may fashion an order, upon a party’s motion or 
its own motion, to limit the effect of waiver when a party inadvertently 
discloses attorney-client privileged information or work product 
materials.”273  Ultimately, because it found that McGuire Woods had 
shown good cause for adding a claw-back agreement to the protective 
order, the court granted McGuire Woods’ motion.274 
    
[71] The court in Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & 
Gas Corp. also recognized the importance of Rule 502(d).275  There, the 
defendant, concerned that a majority of the documents subject to 
mandatory disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) were protected by the attorney–
client privilege and that disclosure of the documents would waive the 
                                                
270 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B)).  The court, however, cannot compel the 
parties to disclose privileged material under Rule 26(c)(1); it may only limit the effect on 
waiver of such a disclosure.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B). 
 
271 Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s 
note). 
 
272 Id. at *3–4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note). 
 
273 Id. at *4. 
 
274 Id. at *6. 
 
275 No. 4:08-CV-684-Y, 2009 WL 464989 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009). 
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privilege in a separate proceeding, moved for a protective order to prevent 
the disclosure of those materials.276  Quoting Rule 502(d), the plaintiff 
argued that the court could ‘“order that the privilege or protection [would 
not be] waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before 
the court–in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other 
Federal or State proceeding.’”277  The defendant incorrectly argued that the 
court only could issue such an order with regard to inadvertent 
disclosures.278  The court clarified that court orders pursuant to Rule 
502(d) could encompass intentional, as well as inadvertent, disclosures, 
and held that it had the authority “to order discovery to proceed and that 
by complying with such an order [compelling discovery, the defendant] 
ha[d] not waived the attorney-client or work-product privilege in the 
[other] suit.”279  
  
[72] In Rajala and Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, the courts did 
not have to address whether they had authority on their own to enter an 
order limiting the waiver of privilege or protection sua sponte.280  Clearly, 
the rule contemplates a court’s power to issue such an order.  The 
Statement of Congressional Intent for Rule 502(d) provides: 
 
This subdivision is designed to enable a court to enter an 
order, whether on motion of one or more parties or on its 
own motion, that will allow the parties to conduct and 
respond to discovery expeditiously, without the need for 
                                                
276 Id. at *1-2. 
 
277 Id. at *4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d)). 
 
278 Id. 
 
279 Id.; see also Alcon Mfg., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 
5070465, at *4–6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008) (relying on Rule 502(d) and a previously–
issued protective order that included a provision expressly addressing the effect of an 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents to determine if a party had waived 
privilege). 
 
280 Ralaja, 2010 WL 2949582, at *8 & n.47; Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, 2009 
WL 464989, at *5-8. 
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exhaustive pre–production privilege reviews, while still 
preserving each party’s right to assert the privilege to 
preclude use in litigation of information disclosed in such 
discovery.281 
 
Because the Rules Enabling Act required Congressional approval to give 
“force or effect” to this rule, the Statement of Congressional Intent is 
afforded significant weight. 282   
  
[73] Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(3), a 
court may include any such claw-back provision in its scheduling order.283  
Should a court conclude that an order limiting the effect on waiver of a 
disclosure of privileged or protected material is proper after the initial 
scheduling order has been issued, the court may modify the scheduling 
order for good cause pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
16(b)(4).284  The court also may issue an order limiting the effect on 
waiver pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(i), which 
states that a court may on its own motion, when required, issue an order 
limiting the “frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these 
rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the discovery sought . . . can 
be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive.”285  Taken together, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(b)(3) and (4), and 
26(b)(2)(C), and the Statement of Congressional Intent provide sufficient 
                                                
281 FED. R. EVID. 502(d) addendum to advisory committee’s note STATEMENT OF 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT (emphasis added). 
 
282 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006).  
 
283 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3) (“The scheduling order must limit the time to . . . 
complete discovery” and may “include other appropriate matters.”). 
 
284 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). 
 
285 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 
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authority for a court, on its own, to issue an order limiting the effect on 
waiver of a disclosure of privilege or protected material.286 
 
VII.  RULE 502(e) 
  
[74] Rule 502(e) allows parties to enter into agreements regarding the 
effect of a disclosure (whether inadvertent or intentional) of privileged or 
protected material.287  Moreover, this subdivision allows a court to 
incorporate any such agreement into a court order and to give the 
agreement the same effect as a court order issued under Rule 502(d).288  
Rule 502(e) states: “An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a Federal 
proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is 
incorporated into a court order.”289 It “codifies the well-established 
proposition that parties can enter an agreement to limit the effect of waiver 
by disclosure between or among them.”290  Although “such an agreement 
can bind only the parties to the agreement,” the rule provides a mechanism 
for the court to incorporate the parties’ agreement into a court order, 
which is the only way for the parties to obtain “protection against non-
parties from a finding of waiver by disclosure.”291  
  
[75] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(3)(B)(iv) allows a court to 
include in its scheduling order “any agreements the parties reach for 
asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material 
after information is produced.”292  Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                                
286 See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)–
(4).  See generally FED. R. EVID. 502(d) addendum to advisory committee’s note 
STATEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT. 
  
287 FED. R. EVID. 502(e). 
 
288 Id. 
 
289  Id. 
 
290 FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note. 
 
291 Id. 
 
292 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv). 
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26(f)(3)(D) requires that the parties include in their discovery plan “any 
issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation 
material, including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these 
claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their 
agreement in an order.”293  Additionally, the 2006 Advisory Committee’s 
Note to Rule 26(f)(3) specifically contemplates the type of claw-back 
agreements that state, “production without intent to waive privilege or 
protection should not be a waiver so long as the responding party 
identifies the documents mistakenly produced, and that the documents 
should be returned under those circumstances.”294  Rule 502 also goes 
hand-in-glove with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), which 
provides: 
 
If information is produced in discovery is subject to a claim 
of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, 
the party making the claim may notify any party that 
received the information of the claim and the basis for it.  
After being notified, a party must promptly return, 
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any 
copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until 
the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve 
the information if the party disclosed it before being 
notified; and may promptly present the information to the 
court under seal for a determination of the claim. The 
producing party must preserve the information until the 
claim is resolved.295  
 
[76] Notably, nothing in the text of either Rule 502(e) or Rule 16(b) or 
26(f) requires parties to undertake “reasonable” precautions to avoid 
disclosure of privileged or protected information as part of a claw-back, 
quick peek or other non-waiver agreement.296  To the contrary, these rules 
                                                
293 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D). 
 
294 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 
295 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 
296 See FED. R. EVID. 502(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).  
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would permit the parties to agree that discovery material could be 
produced without any pre-production screening at all, but be “clawed” 
back upon demand after production.297  In this regard, the court in Rajala 
correctly pointed out that the agreement of the parties may contain a 
provision that allows for the return of a privileged or protected document 
“‘irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party.’”298  However, as 
will be discussed in the next section, some courts have failed to enforce 
non-waiver agreements that parties have reached, because the producing 
party failed to take reasonable pre-production measures to avoid 
disclosure of privileged or protected information.  These decisions fail to 
interpret Rule 502 correctly. 
 
VIII.  THE VULNERABILITY TO DATE OF RULE 502(d) AND (e) 
AND 26(b)(5)(B) AGREEMENTS TO RULE 502(b)(2) 
AND (3)’S REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT 
 
[77] Although Rule 502(d) and (e) and the accompanying Advisory 
Committee’s Note appear straightforward, some courts have engrafted 
onto them a “reasonableness” test that clearly is not contemplated by the 
rule itself.299  In fact, the Committee’s Note states the exact opposite with 
regard to Rule 502(d): “[T]he court order may provide for the return of 
documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing 
party.”300  Similarly, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(5)(B) (via Rules 16(b) and 
26(f)), parties may ask the court to include in a court order any agreement 
they reach pertaining to waiver of privileged or protected information, and 
the parties’ agreements and the related court orders “ordinarily control if 
they adopt procedures different from those in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).”301 
                                                
297 See generally FED. R. EVID. 502(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); FED. 
R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note.  
 
298 Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at *4 (D. 
Kan. July 22, 2010) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note). 
 
299 See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e); see also FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e) advisory committee’s 
note.  
 
300 FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added). 
 
301 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s note. 
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[78] Yet, some courts have displayed a misguided reluctance to accept 
that parties may agree to procedures that would not be deemed reasonable 
under Rule 502(b)(2) or (3).  For example, in Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, 
LLC, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant could 
avoid an estimated $250,000 in pre-production review costs by entering 
into an agreement under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) and 
502 in which the defendant would not have to conduct such a review, but 
rather could produce the documents subject to the right to assert privilege 
thereafter.302  The court stated:  
 
The difficulty with this argument is that Rule 502(b) 
preserves the privilege if “the holder of the privilege or 
protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” of 
the privileged material.  Simply turning over all ESI 
materials does not show that a party has taken “the 
reasonable steps” to prevent disclosure of its privileged 
materials and plaintiffs’ proposal is flawed.303  
 
[79] The court’s comments failed to account for the Advisory 
Committee’s Notes to Rules 502 and 26(b)(5)(B), and, more importantly, 
entirely ignored Rule 502(d) and (e), which would permit the parties to do 
exactly what was proposed, and which encourage the court to approve it.  
Rulings such as that rendered in Spieker fly in the face of the clear intent 
of Rule 502 and ignore the rule’s explicit provisions.  Contrary to such 
rulings, parties should be permitted the flexibility to enter into non-waiver 
agreements that permit less than full compliance with Rule 502(b)(2) pre-
production review.  This freedom would allow parties to avoid 
disproportionate discovery costs occasioned by comprehensive pre-
production review for privilege or work-product protection. 
  
[80] Luna Gaming-San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP is an 
example of a case in which the court declined to enforce the parties’ non-
                                                
302 Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225-EFM, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3 (D. 
Kan. July 21, 2009). 
 
303 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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waiver agreement.304  The parties entered into a protective order approved 
by a magistrate judge, which outlined the procedures they would follow to 
resolve any disputes relating to allegations of inadvertently produced 
privileged documents.305  During discovery, the plaintiff produced 
privileged documents, which the defendant’s counsel used during a 
deposition, without objection by the plaintiff’s counsel.306  Several months 
later, during another deposition, the defendant’s counsel used as an exhibit 
another privileged document that the plaintiff had produced, at which time 
the plaintiff’s counsel objected and invoked the “claw-back” provision of 
the protective order.307  Defendant’s counsel objected, arguing that the use 
of privileged documents during a deposition several months earlier, 
without objection by the plaintiff’s attorney, waived any privilege 
claims.308  Thereafter, the defendant’s attorney continued to question the 
deponent about the document, without objection by the plaintiff’s 
counsel.309  However, the next day, when defense counsel again attempted 
to use the privileged document as a deposition exhibit, plaintiff’s counsel 
objected and once again invoked the claw-back provision in the protective 
order.310  Defendant did not use privileged documents any more during 
discovery, and counsel did not discuss further the return of any asserted 
privileged documents to the plaintiff.311  The defendant subsequently filed 
two motions for summary judgment and included privileged documents as 
exhibits in support of the motions, and the plaintiff did not object.312  
                                                
304 No. 06cv2804 BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010). 
 
305 Id. at *1. 
 
306 Id. 
 
307 Id. 
 
308 Id. 
 
309  Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC, 2010 WL 275083, at *1. 
 
310 Id. at *2. 
 
311 Id. 
 
312 Id. 
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[81] Ultimately, a dispute arose about whether the plaintiff had waived 
its claims of privilege regarding the documents that defendant used as its 
summary judgment exhibits.313  The magistrate judge held that the 
privileged documents had been produced inadvertently, and the plaintiff 
had not waived its privilege.314  The magistrate judge agreed with the 
defendant that the plaintiff should have objected earlier, but said that once 
the plaintiff eventually objected, the defendant was obligated under the 
protective agreement to return the documents immediately, and its failure 
to do so violated the protective order.315  Additionally, while finding both 
plaintiff and defendant culpable, the magistrate judge viewed the 
defendant as more culpable, because the protective order required the 
defendant to seek a judicial resolution of the waiver issue before using the 
disputed documents as summary judgment exhibits.316 
  
[82] When the defendant objected to this ruling, the district judge 
upheld a number of the magistrate judge’s rulings, but overruled the 
magistrate judge’s ruling that plaintiff had not waived the privilege.317  
The court based its ruling on Rule 502(b)(3), finding that the plaintiff had 
failed to promptly initiate remedial action once it learned of the 
inadvertent production of privileged materials, despite the fact that the 
parties had entered into a protective order, signed by the magistrate judge, 
that permitted the plaintiff to claw-back any inadvertently produced 
privileged documents.318  The court held the plaintiff’s privilege waived as 
the language of the protective order did not specify how or when a party 
was required to exercise the claw-back provision after finding that 
privileged documents inadvertently had been produced, and stated: 
 
                                                
313 Id. 
 
314  Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC, 2010 WL 275083, at *2. 
 
315 Id. 
 
316 Id. 
 
317 Id. at *4, 7. 
 
318 Id. at *6–7. 
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Although the Protective Order states that the inadvertent 
disclosure of privileged documents “shall not constitute a 
waiver of any privilege,” it does not address under what 
circumstances failure to object to the use of inadvertently 
produced privileged documents waives the privilege . . . . 
Furthermore, even if the Protective Order’s provisions did 
apply to this dispute, [the plaintiff’s] repeated failures to 
object to the use of the Privileged Documents . . . waived 
any protections it could have invoked under the Protective 
Order.319 
 
[83] This is a sobering lesson for litigants who wish to take advantage 
of Rule 502(e) and enter into binding non-waiver agreements with their 
opposing counsel: while they may do so, they must exercise great care in 
drafting such agreements.  If a non-waiver agreement is ambiguous, as in 
Luna Gaming, the court may take a formalist view and resort to analysis 
under Rule 502 if the agreement does not explicitly govern resolution of 
the dispute.320  In Luna Gaming, the parties clearly intended to allow post-
production assertion of a privilege through the claw-back provision.321  
However, because the protective order did not particularize that procedure, 
the court analyzed the issue under Rule 502(b)(3).322  Thus, the court 
found waiver and held that the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 
502(b)(3) because the plaintiff repeatedly failed to object or demand the 
return of the inadvertently produced privileged documents.323  
  
[84] The take-away point is crystal clear here.  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) specifically contemplates that parties may negotiate 
their own non-waiver agreements, and that these procedures are intended 
                                                
319 Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC, 2010 WL 275083, at *4. 
 
320 See id. 
 
321 See id. at *1.  
 
322 See id. at *4. 
 
323 See id. at *5–7. 
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to control notwithstanding any inconsistency with procedures stated in the 
rule.324  Similarly, Rule 502(d) clearly contemplates that when a court 
issues an order — sua sponte, or at the joint request of the parties — to the 
effect that certain disclosures of privileged or protected information do not 
constitute a waiver, it can approve procedures that would not otherwise 
pass muster under Rule 502(b)(2) or (3).325  Further, Rule 502(e) allows 
the parties to enter into such an agreement to avoid waiver without court 
approval.326   
 
[85] Expressed differently, Rule 502(d) and (e) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B) 
are intended to operate in concert to permit parties to negotiate their own 
non-waiver agreements under whatever terms they want, even if 
inconsistent with Rule 26(b)(5)(B) or 502(b).  Moreover, Rule 502(d) and 
                                                
324 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
 
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides a procedure for presenting and addressing 
[issues regarding post-production assertion of privilege or work-
product].  Rule 26(b)(5)(B) works in tandem with Rule 26(f), which is 
amended to direct the parties to discuss privilege issues in preparing 
their discovery plan, and which, with amended Rule 16(b), allows the 
parties to ask the court to include in an order any agreements the parties 
reach regarding issues of privilege or trial-preparation material 
protection.  Agreements reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders 
including such agreements entered under Rule 16(b)(6) may be 
considered when a court determines whether a waiver has occurred.  
Such agreements and orders ordinarily control if they adopt 
procedures different from those in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).  
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added). 
 
325 See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).  “For example, the court order may provide for return of 
documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party; the rule 
contemplates enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quick peek’ arrangements as a way to 
avoid the excessive costs of pre–production review for privilege and work product.”  
FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added) (citing Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).  
 
326 See FED. R. EVID. 502(e); FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note 
(“Subdivision (e) codifies the well-established proposition that parties can enter an 
agreement to limit the effect of waiver by disclosure between or among them.”).  
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(e) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B) encourage courts to approve such agreements by 
issuing a protective order if requested to do so, or on their own volition.  
Thus, for example, it would be perfectly appropriate for the parties to a 
lawsuit to enter into a non-waiver agreement that permitted the defendant 
to produce all its documents to plaintiff without conducting any pre-
production review for privilege or work product, in order to avoid the 
expense of doing so, while reserving the right to “claw-back” at a later 
time any privileged documents that were produced.  This procedure would 
never pass muster under Rule 502(b)(2), because it cannot seriously be 
argued that doing no pre-production review at all meets the requirement of 
Rule 502(b)(2) to take “reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.”327   
Nevertheless, if the parties negotiate such an agreement, as they are 
permitted to do under Rule 502(d) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B) in order to avoid 
the expense of reviewing voluminous ESI for privilege and work product, 
while reserving the right to claw-back privileged or protected documents 
after they have been produced, that agreement “trumps” any contrary 
obligation that Rule 502 or 26(b)(5)(B) would impose in the absence of an 
agreement.328   
 
[86] What Luna Gaming, and the decisions discussed below, make 
clear, however, is that courts asked to enforce non-waiver agreements 
entered into by the parties may be reluctant, or even hostile, when asked to 
construe the agreements beyond their specific language, and may be 
inclined to construe any ambiguity against the drafters.  In Luna Gaming, 
the failure of the claw-back provision in the protective order to specify 
how and when the party invoking that clause was obligated to do so 
resulted in the court disregarding the agreement in favor of analysis under 
Rule 502(b)(3), which resulted in a finding of waiver.329  One may argue 
that it is more consistent with the underlying purpose of Rule 502 for a 
reviewing court to construe broadly an ambiguous non-waiver agreement 
and thereby further the litigants’ intent to reduce discovery costs and avoid 
                                                
327 FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2).   
 
328 See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note.  
 
329 See Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804 BTM 
(WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010). 
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waiver, but, to date, the courts addressing this issue have taken an 
unfortunate and unnecessarily strict constructionist approach.  Unless this 
changes, parties will need to exercise extreme care in drafting such 
agreements to ensure that they clearly address the process by which parties 
may assert privileges under the agreement and avoid the control of Rule 
502(b) or common law waiver doctrine.   
  
[87] In Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Felman Production, Inc, the 
parties’ claw-back agreement proved ineffective against waiver.330  The 
parties entered into an “ESI Stipulation” governing discovery, which 
contained a claw-back provision, but they did not submit it to the court for 
approval or incorporation into a protective order.331  The claw-back 
provision in the ESI Stipulation permitted a party to request return of any 
inadvertently-produced privileged or protected information within ten 
days of discovery of its production, after which, within five days, the 
receiving party was obligated to return or destroy all copies, subject to the 
ability of the receiving party to file a motion to compel.332  Interestingly, 
the claw-back provided: “[c]ompliance by the producing party with the 
steps required by this [agreement] shall be sufficient, notwithstanding any 
argument by a party to the contrary, to satisfy the reasonableness 
requirement of FRE 502(b)(3).”333  Thus, unlike the agreement in Luna 
Gaming, the claw-back agreement in Mt. Hawley contained specific 
deadlines in which the producing party was to give notice to the receiving 
party of inadvertent production, and contemplated that the procedures in 
the claw-back would trump any other inquiry under Rule 502(b)(2) or 
(3).334  Pursuant to the claw-back agreement, the plaintiff demanded return 
of an inadvertently produced privileged e-mail, but the defendant refused 
                                                
330 See generally Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.W. Va. 
2010).   
 
331 Id. at 128–29. 
 
332 Id. at 129.  
 
333 Id. 
 
334 Id.  
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and asserted that any privilege had been waived due to the plaintiff’s 
failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure.335  The 
defendant also argued that privilege was inapplicable by virtue of the 
crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege.336  
 
[88] The court ruled that the plaintiff had complied with the notice 
requirements of the claw-back, thereby satisfying Rule 502(b)(3), and that 
the defendant violated the claw-back by failing to return or destroy the e-
mail.337  Nevertheless, the court found that, despite the claw-back 
provision that memorialized the parties’ agreement regarding Rule 
502(b)(3) post-production responsibilities, the plaintiff failed to meet its 
Rule 502(b)(2) obligation to take reasonable steps to avoid production of 
the e-mail in the first place, and found waiver had occurred.338  Though it 
is clear that the parties could have negotiated a non-waiver agreement 
pursuant to Rule 502(e) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B),339 allowing producing 
parties to engage in no pre-production review at all and reserving the right 
to claw-back privileged or protected information, the agreement was silent 
as to any pre-production precautions that were to be taken.340  This led the 
court to conclude that the claw-back agreement was inapplicable to pre-
production obligations, and on that basis, it analyzed the plaintiff’s 
conduct under Rule 502(b)(2)’s reasonableness standard.341  Thus, because 
the non-waiver agreement that the parties negotiated did not specifically 
                                                
335 Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 127. 
 
336 Id.  
 
337 See id. at 130. 
 
338 See id. at 133–36.   
 
339 See supra notes 324 and 325; see also Gilday v. Kenra, Ltd., No: 1:09-cv-00229-
TWP-TAB, 2010 WL 3928593, at *4 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2010) (“Rule 502 does not 
apply if the parties have their own agreement regarding inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged documents.”). 
 
340 See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 128–29 (discussing the requirements of the 
parties’ agreement which included no mention of pre-production guidelines). 
 
341 Id. at 133. 
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address the pre-production obligations of producing parties, it was 
ineffective despite its otherwise comprehensive provisions regarding post-
production obligations, and the court was unwilling to infer from the 
totality of the claw-back provision an intent to alter Rule 502(b)(2) as well 
as 502(b)(3).342   
  
[89] Once again, the lesson for parties is clear.  When drafting a non-
waiver agreement under Rule 502(e) and Rule 26(b)(5)(B), painstaking 
care should be taken to ensure that the agreement clearly addresses both 
pre-production and post-production obligations.  Otherwise the parties run 
the risk that the court will make its waiver determinations in accordance 
with Rule 502(b)(2) and (3) instead of the non-waiver agreement.   
  
[90] The court in United States v. Sensient Colors took a similar 
approach to the Mt. Hawley court.343  In Sensient Colors, the parties agreed 
upon a joint discovery plan that contained the following paragraphs: III.A  
“Non-waiver: By exchanging documents or information with each other, 
the Parties do not waive any privilege, confidentiality or other protection 
from production that otherwise applies to such documents or information,” 
and VI. “The Parties agree that the inadvertent production of privileged 
documents or information (including ESI) shall not, in and of itself, waive 
any privilege that would otherwise attach to the document or information 
produced.”344  The plaintiff argued that this language precluded a finding 
that 214 inadvertently produced privileged documents constituted a 
waiver.345  The court categorically dismissed this argument, stating:  
 
This argument is rejected.  Nowhere in the Discovery Plan 
does it mention that the parties are excused form [sic] the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) . . . . 
                                                
342 See id. 
 
343 See United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474, 
at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009). 
 
344 Id. at *2 n.4. 
 
345 See id. at *2. 
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Plaintiff and Sensient are represented by sophisticated 
counsel.  If they intended to implement a “clawback” 
provision this would have been specifically mentioned.346   
 
While the court acknowledged that the parties could have negotiated a 
claw-back agreement that would have undone an inadvertent production of 
privileged information “irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing 
party,”347 it observed that “[c]ourts generally frown upon . . . such blanket 
[non-waiver agreements]” because they “essentially immuniz[e] attorneys 
from negligent handling of documents,” and can lead to “sloppy attorney 
review and improper disclosure which could jeopardize clients’ cases.”348 
  
[91] Two observations flow from the court’s analysis.  First, following 
the enactment of Rule 502 and Rule 26(b)(5)(B), it no longer can be said 
that “blanket” non-waiver agreements are “generally frown[ed] upon,”349 
as the Advisory Committee’s Notes to each rule makes it clear that parties 
may agree to procedures that are not consistent with those stated in the 
rules.350  Importantly, with the additions of Rule 26(b)(5)(B) in 2006 and 
Rule 502(d) and (e) in 2008, Congress intended specifically to change the 
prior common law rules regarding privilege waiver by inadvertent 
                                                
346 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 
347 Id. at *2 n.6 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)). 
 
348 Sensient Colors, Inc., 2009 WL 2905474, at *3. 
 
349 Id. 
 
350 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“For example, the court order may 
provide for return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the 
disclosing party; [Rule 502] contemplates enforcement of  ‘claw-back’ and ‘quick peek’ 
arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive costs of pre-production review for privilege 
and work product.” (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) advisory committee’s 
note (“Rule 26(b)(5)(B) works in tandem with Rule 26(f) . . . which, with amended Rule 
16(b), allows the parties to ask the court to include in an order any agreements the 
parties reach regarding issues of privilege or trial-preparation material protection.  
Agreements reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders including such agreements entered 
under Rule 16(b)(6) . . . . ordinarily control if they adopt procedures different from those 
in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).”) (emphasis added).    
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production of privileged or protected information.  Congress recognized 
that, especially with regard to ESI discovery, “litigation costs necessary to 
protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have 
become prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however 
innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver . . . .”351  It is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the intent of Rule 502 to conclude that 
courts have an obligation to insist that parties undertake costly pre-
production review for privilege or work product if they are amenable to an 
agreement not to do so, subject to a claw-back agreement.  Continuing to 
do so would thwart the goals Congress intended to achieve by enacting 
Rule 502.352   
  
[92] Second, Sensient Colors again illustrates an instance in which a 
court was unwilling to interpret a non-waiver agreement broadly, in 
concert with the obvious intent of the parties, but rather chose to do so 
narrowly.353  This further underscores the need for parties to exercise 
extreme care in drafting non-waiver agreements to address specifically 
both their pre- and post-production disclosure obligations in connection 
with inadvertent production of privileged or protected information.  As 
litigants and courts gain more experience with Rule 502, it is hoped that 
parties will exercise greater care in drafting non-waiver agreements and 
courts will abandon any reluctance to interpret non-waiver agreements 
broadly to fulfill their purpose.  In the meantime, counsel drafting non-
waiver agreements pursuant to Rule 502(e) should consider the following 
issues. 
 
                                                
351 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
352 See id. 
 
353 See Sensient Colors, Inc., 2009 WL 2905474, at *3; see also N. Am. Rescue Prods., 
Inc. v. Bound Tree Med., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-101, 2010 WL 1873291, at *9 (S.D. Ohio 
May 10, 2010) (concluding that the “claw-back” or “no waiver” provisions of the 
protective order that the parties entered into did not prevent a finding that inadvertent 
production of privileged e-mails constituted waiver because the parties limited the 
protective order’s scope to “Designated Materials” and the e-mails had not been so 
designated). 
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[93] First, when drafting a non-waiver agreement pursuant to Rule 
502(e), counsel must determine whether they will ask the court to approve 
it, pursuant to Rule 502(d).  The primary advantage for doing so is that the 
non-waiver agreement is then binding on third parties, in both state and 
federal proceedings.354  A secondary advantage is that seeking court 
approval provides the parties with an opportunity to make clear to the 
court any unusual aspects of the agreement, such as a provision that the 
producing party will not do any pre-production review for privilege or 
work-product protection.355  That way, if the court has any concerns about 
approving such a provision, the parties have an opportunity to remind the 
court that the provision is perfectly appropriate, as noted in the Advisory 
Committee’s Note to Rule 502(d).356  If the court agrees and approves the 
provision, then the parties can feel secure in complying with it.357  If the 
court refuses to approve the provision however, then the parties become 
aware of this up front, and will have to undertake some measure of pre-
production review for privilege or protection.358  When the court insists on 
requiring such review, it would be both wise and appropriate to discuss in 
advance what the court expects, and to explore whether measures such as 
computer-based searching would be reasonable.  If so, the parties should 
make sure the court is aware of, and approves of, the methodology the 
parties propose to use.  This will help counsel eliminate the problems 
experienced in Mt. Hawley359 and Spieker.360  Finally, even if the parties 
intend to undertake extensive pre-production review for privilege or work-
product protection, and they do not foresee any possible waiver that could 
be asserted by non-parties to the litigation, there is no disadvantage in 
                                                
354 See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
 
355 See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note. 
 
356 See id. 
 
358 See id. 
 
359 See generally Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.W. Va. 
2010). 
 
360 See generally Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225-EFM, 2009 WL 2168892 
(D. Kan. July 21, 2009). 
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seeking and obtaining court approval of their non-waiver agreement, with 
its concomitant protection against non-parties. 
  
[94] Second, if parties intend to enter into a non-waiver agreement, they 
cannot afford to allow the agreement to be ambiguous about whether the 
parties will undertake pre-production review, and if so, what level of 
review they will employ.  Parties should keep in mind that they can agree 
to forego pre-production review, subject to a claw-back agreement.361  
However, parties should expressly state any such agreement and consider 
including an explanation of why they have elected to forego pre-
production review.  Prudent parties will cite the cost-benefit 
proportionality factors of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and explain why, given what is 
at issue in the case, foregoing pre-production review is appropriate under 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii) factors.362  This will help persuade a reviewing 
court that the parties tailored the procedures they selected to fit the needs 
of the particular case and in accord with Rule 26(b)(2)(C), rather than 
acting sloppy or incautious, as was the court’s concern in Spieker.363  
Similarly, if the parties intend to conduct pre-production review, they 
should carefully consider what they intend to do.  If the planned review is 
less than an individual review of each document produced (especially if 
the parties will employ computer-based search methodology), the parties 
should state the parameters of the review explicitly and keep in mind some 
of the concerns the Mt. Hawley court expressed.364  The parties should 
either design their pre-production review to address those concerns, or 
                                                
361 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting 
that many parties “enter into so-called ‘claw-back’ agreements that allow the parties to 
forego privilege review altogether in favor of an agreement to return inadvertently 
produced privileged documents”). 
 
362 See Bradley T. Tennis, Cost-Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 119 YALE L.J. 1113, 
1115 (2010) (noting that the cost-benefit proportionality factors of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) were 
implemented to limit discovery requests for ESI that is proven to be “‘not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B)). 
 
363 See Spieker, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3 (explaining that defendant’s estimate for the 
cost to conduct a “privilege and relevance” review was greatly exaggerated and flawed). 
 
364 See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. at 136. 
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state why they selected the methods they intend to employ, and why the 
methods are appropriate. 
  
[95] Parties should keep in mind that Rule 502(e) allows them to decide 
for themselves what, if any, pre-production review measures they want to 
undertake.365  Since Rule 502(e) does not require parties to meet Rule 
502(b)(2) pre-production “reasonableness,” parties should be very 
cautious when drafting their non-waiver agreement so they do not adopt 
this standard themselves.366  The take-away point is that it is essential to 
consider carefully what level of pre-production review, if any, the parties 
agree to, and to ensure that this is clearly stated in the Rule 502(e) non-
waiver agreement. 
  
[96] Third, parties should keep in mind that Rule 502(e) agreements 
apply to preclude waiver for any disclosure, whether inadvertent or 
purposeful.367  Accordingly, when drafting a non-waiver agreement, 
counsel should be explicit in stating the scope of their non-waiver 
agreement and make sure the scope matches the procedures they intend to 
apply.  For example, a claw-back agreement wherein a party intends to 
produce documents without complete pre-production review contemplates 
purposeful, not inadvertent, production.  It would be a mistake to draft a 
claw-back provision as part of a Rule 502(e) agreement that states that it is 
intended to protect against “inadvertent” disclosure of privileged or 
protected information.  Parties would be wise to consider drafting their 
non-waiver agreements to cover the broadest range of contingencies, 
which would cover both inadvertent and purposeful disclosure of 
privileged and work product protected information.  Doing so will 
                                                
365 FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note. 
 
366 Compare FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (stating the 
“reasonableness” factors that must be met for pre-production review), with FED. R. EVID. 
502(e) advisory committee’s note  (excluding any such “reasonableness” requirement). 
 
367 See FED. R. EVID. 502(e) advisory committee’s note  (“The rule makes clear that if 
parties want protection against non-parties from a finding of waiver by disclosure, the 
agreement must be made part of a court order.”).  The Rule does not limit the type of 
disclosure that may be precluded.  See id. 
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eliminate the difficulty experienced by the parties in Sensient Colors, 
where the agreement only afforded protection against inadvertent 
production of privileged or protected information. 368  
 
[97] Fourth, parties must keep in mind that Rule 502 affords protection 
against waiver by disclosure of both attorney–client privileged and work 
product protected information.369  When drafting such agreements, counsel 
should state explicitly that it applies to both categories of protected 
information.370 
  
[98] Fifth, parties should exercise particular care in drafting non-waiver 
agreement language that identifies what they must do, and when, upon 
discovering that privileged or protected information has been produced, 
whether inadvertently or intentionally.  They would be wise to remember 
that Rule 502(b)(3) imposes no post-production duty to review what has 
been produced to discover if privileged or protected information has been 
produced.371  If the rule itself does not do so, the parties should be 
particularly wary of doing so themselves.  Additionally, in drafting a non-
waiver agreement, parties should pay particular attention to whether they 
should impose upon themselves a particular deadline within which they 
must give the notice contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(5)(B) that they are invoking a post-production claim of privilege or 
work-product protection.372  As noted above, a number of reviewing courts 
have held that parties were not entitled to the protection of non-waiver 
                                                
368 See United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474, 
at *2 n.4 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009). 
 
369 FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 
370 See eDIGital Newsletter – December 2010, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://www.seyfarth.com/ (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Newsletters” 
hyperlink; then follow “eDIGital Newsletter – December 2010” hyperlink) (noting that 
counsel should implement clear non-waiver language in confidentiality and protective 
orders). 
 
371  See FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
 
372  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
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agreements they drafted because they failed to particularize what they 
were to do, and when they were to do so, upon discovering that privileged 
or protected information had been disclosed, or they failed to comply with 
the procedures that had been drafted into the agreement.373   
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
  
[99] If it lives up to its purpose, Rule 502 should clarify and limit the 
effect of disclosure of privileged or protected information and waiver of 
the privilege or protection.  Further, it should enable parties to reduce the 
escalating costs associated with privilege and protection review by 
permitting them to forego manual document review in favor of electronic 
search and retrieval methods and/or non-waiver agreements that 
themselves limit the effect of waiver.  The framework exists for Rule 502 
to function as intended, but thus far it has not fulfilled its purpose, mainly 
because parties have overlooked it and courts have not construed it 
consistently with its purpose—or consistently with each other—such that 
counsel and litigants are left without the protections and uniform set of 
standards that the rule should provide.374  To achieve Rule 502’s purpose, 
courts should keep in mind the key points that this article attempts to 
illuminate for interpreting the rule.   
 
[100] First, “intentional waiver” under Rule 502(a) results from 
production of information known to be privileged or protected that was 
“voluntary” and not “inadvertent,” and, while the fairness provision found 
in Rule 502(a)(3) generally provides greater protection for opinion work 
product, it would be a mistake to categorically prohibit subject matter 
                                                
373 See, e.g., Luna Gaming–San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06cv2804 
BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (finding waiver because 
waiving party did not take affirmative steps to retrieve the document in question); 
Sensient Colors, 2009 WL 2905474, at *5–6 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that a non-
waiver agreement protected against waiver regarding inadvertently produced privileged 
documents, and finding waiver because the parties were sophisticated and had been 
represented by counsel and the agreement merely protected against “inadvertent” 
production of privileged or protected information without specifically stating that it 
contained a “claw-back” provision). 
 
374  See supra Part II.C. 
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waiver of opinion work product on that basis if all the elements of Rule 
502(a) are met.375  Second, reasonableness of pre-production procedures 
should not be a consideration in determining whether production of 
attorney–client privileged documents was inadvertent under Rule 
502(b)(1).  The more useful approach is to equate “inadvertence” under 
Rule 502(b)(1) with “mistaken” or “unintentional” production.  Of utmost 
importance, Rule 502(b)(2) and (3), which require reasonableness, do not 
demand perfection, and courts should take care not to require it.376  The 
proportionality factors in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) also 
are useful in assessing reasonableness under Rule 502(b)(2).  Rule 
502(b)(3) does not require post-production review until a party has notice 
that it may have produced privileged or protected information 
inadvertently.377   
 
[101] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) outlines a means of 
reasonable post-production remediation, and it is intended to work with 
Rule 26(f), which directs parties to address privilege and protection issues 
in their discovery plan and allows them to ask the court to include any 
agreement they reach on those issues in a court order.378  The multi-factor 
test from pre-502 case law for determining whether inadvertent production 
of privileged or protected information constitutes waiver is informative 
but not dispositive, and particular care should be exercised in evaluating 
whether the “fairness” of a finding of waiver should militate in favor of a 
ruling that no waiver occurred if the party that inadvertently produced 
privileged or protected information failed to take reasonable pre- and post-
production actions.   
  
[102] Third, pursuant to Rule 502(d), the court may issue an order—at 
the parties’ behest or sua sponte—allowing the parties to engage in 
discovery without worrying about the consequences of waiver of privilege 
                                                
375  See supra Part III. 
 
376 See supra notes 167 & 205 and accompanying text. 
 
377  See FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). 
 
378  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B), 26(f). 
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or protection in the case before it or any other proceeding, and pursuant to 
Rule 502(e), the parties may enter into an agreement limiting waiver in the 
litigation between them and, if adopted as a court order under Rule 502(d), 
in any other proceeding.379  Thus, under Rule 502(d) orders and 502(e) 
agreements that provide otherwise, the parties need not take reasonable 
precautions to avoid disclosure of privileged or protected information, 
because the reasonableness requirements of Rule 502(b)(2) and (3) do not 
apply to disclosures made pursuant to a Rule 502(d) order or Rule 502(e) 
agreement. 
  
[103] Finally, counsel and litigants should be mindful of court decisions 
when crafting non-waiver agreements, so that the agreements do not fall 
prey to interpretations contrary to the rule’s purpose.  Explicit provisions, 
which do not presuppose a court’s willingness to uphold or broadly 
interpret the agreement, are essential.  Keeping in mind that Rule 502(e) 
agreements may preclude waiver for inadvertent and purposeful 
disclosures of privileged and work-product protected information, parties 
should state the broad application intended in the agreement explicitly.  If 
the parties elect to forego pre-production review, they should state so 
expressly in their agreement, along with an explanation for their decision 
that incorporates the cost-benefit proportionality factors of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(2)(C).380  If they agree to undertake pre-production review, they 
should state the parameters of the review explicitly.  
 
[104] Parties also should state explicitly what they must do, and when, 
upon discovering that privileged or protected information has been 
produced.  They should consider whether they will seek court approval of 
their agreement pursuant to Rule 502(d), and, if the court requires pre-
production review, counsel should discuss the parameters of that review 
with the court, including whether the court considers electronic search 
methods reasonable.  Following these steps should help counsel draft 
agreements that effectively limit the effects of waiver.  Moreover, if courts 
interpret and implement Rule 502 and parties’ agreements in accord with 
the principles identified above, they will help achieve the purpose of the 
                                                
379  See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)–(e). 
 
380  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
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rule by consistently limiting the effects of waiver and associated privilege 
and production review costs.  
